Clausal intuitionistic logic II. tableau proof procedures  by McCarty, L.Thorne
J. LOGIC PROGRAMMING 1988:5:93-132 93 
CLAUSAL INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC 
II. TABLEAU PROOF PROCEDURES 
L. THORNJI MCCARTY 
D Clausal intuitionistic logic is an extension of Horn-clause logic which 
permits the appearance of negations and embedded implications on the 
right-hand side of a rule, and interprets these new rules intuitionistically in 
a set of partial models. In this article the second of a pair, clausal 
intuitionistic logic, is shown to have a tableau proof procedure that gener- 
alizes Horn-clause refutation proofs. The proof procedures are explained by 
means of several detailed examples. Soundness and completeness theorems 
are stated and proven in full detail. a 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the advent of Horn-clause logic programming in the mid 1970s there have 
been numerous attempts to extend the expressive power of Horn-clause logic while 
preserving some of its attractive computational properties. In the first paper of this 
pair, we introduced a language that extends Horn-clause logic by adding the 
following rules for negations: 
pw .= ~Q(x; Y), 
p(x) * lQtx;y) 
and the following rules for embedded implications: 
P(x)~[Q(x;~>=)R(x;y)l, 
p(x) = [42(x; Y) * NV Y)l 
where the variables y are given an implicit universal quantification with scope 
extending just outside the right-hand side of the rule. Our proposal was to interpret 
these new rules intuitionistically, rather than classically, and under this interpreta- 
tion we were able to develop a fixed-point semantics for negations and embedded 
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implications that generalizes the standard fixed-point semantics for Horn clauses 
[29, 11. Specifically, letting B =9(H) be the powerset lattice over the Herbrand 
base, letting J,, be the largest subset of B that satisfies the Horn clauses P *AQj 
and P *VQ, and the new rules in the form P - 7Q and P - [Q =+ R], and letting 
TN be a certain monotonic transformation associated with the new rules in the form 
P e= -Q and P = [Q * R], we constructed the greatest fixed point K* of the 
transformation T(J) = T,(J) I? Jo, and we showed (in Theorem 3.7) that KY is the 
unique maximal Kripke model for the total set of rules .% among all subsets of B. 
Furthermore, we established (in Theorem 3.15) that K* itself contains a unique 
minimal substate llK*, and that 
flK*> l-lJ,> U{ llT;(J,)]k<w}. 
As a corollary, we showed that every successful query ‘P(x)? in a system of rules 
including negations and embedded implications has a definite answer substitution 
for the variables x. However, we also demonstrated by example that the transforma- 
tion T(J) = T,(J) n Jo is not, in general, continuous, and that the inequality in 
Theorem 3.15 is not, in general, an equality. As a result, despite the similarity in the 
fixed-point semantics, we showed that it is not possible to extend the simple 
constructive proof of the completeness theorem for Horn-clause refutation in [29] 
and [l] to cover the general case of negations and embedded implications. For the 
details of this analysis, the reader should consult the original article. 
In this, the second paper, we will present our positive results on the proof theory 
for clausal intuitionistic logic. Specifically, we will investigate a proposed proof 
procedure for negations and embedded implications which resembles the standard 
Horn-clause proof procedure in the following way: The proof begins with a query 
‘P(x)? at the top node of a refutation tree, and, if it is successful, it concludes by 
returning an answer substitution for the variables x. But the refutation tree in our 
proof appears inside a structure called an initial tableau, and whenever the proof 
procedure encounters a negation rule in the form P elQ, or an embedded 
implication rule in the form P c= [ Q a R], it creates a new structure called an 
auxiliary tableau which contains additional formulae and additional refutation trees. 
We will show that this procedure is sound (Theorem 4.3) and complete (Theorem 
4.6) with respect to our fixed-point semantics, so that it faithfully computes the 
answers that are entailed by an intuitionistic interpretation of the negation and 
embedded implication rules. However, as suggested by the negative results in the 
first paper of this pair, the proof of the completeness theorem here is much more 
complicated than the proof of the completeness theorem in the pure Horn-clause 
case [29, 11. 
The proof theory for clausal intuitionistic logic is discussed in Section 4 below, 
which constitutes the bulk of this paper. Section 5 contains a brief discussion of 
related work, and Section 6 outlines several extensions of our system that are left 
open for future investigation. 
4. NEGATIONS AND EMBEDDED IMPLICATIONS: INFERENCE 
In this section, we will analyze a proposed proof procedure for a system of rules 
including negations and embedded implications. We will call it a tableau proof 
procedure because it resembles in some respects the tableau procedure used by Saul 
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Kripke in his original completeness theorem for modal logic [13-151. In particular, 
there is a direct correspondence in our system between the tableaux constructed in a 
proof and the lattice of substates defined in the semantics, as there is in Kripke’s 
system. However, instead of building the tableaux out of sets of first-order formulae, 
as Kripke did, generalizing the semantic tableaux of Beth, we will build them out of 
Horn-clause refutation trees. Our proposed proof procedure is therefore a natural 
generalization of Horn-clause logic programming. A similar approach has also been 
suggested by Graham Wrightson in [31]. 
Actually, we will discuss two slightly different proof procedures in this section, 
and several additional variations. The first procedure, called the standard proof 
procedure, is intended for most practical computations, but it is difficult to work 
with directly in the soundness and completeness theorems. This procedure will be 
described informally in Section 4.1, and it will be illustrated with two detailed 
examples. The second procedure, called the simplified proof procedure, is intended 
for use in the soundness and completeness theorems, but it is potentially very 
inefficient. This procedure will be formally specified in Section 4.2. The soundness 
theorem for clausal intuitionistic logic will then be proven in Section 4.3, and the 
completeness theorem will be proven in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, using these 
results, we will return to the fixed-point semantics of Section 3 and prove a sharper 
version of Theorem 3.15. Finally, in Section 4.6, we will demonstrate the equiv- 
alence of the standard and the simplified proof procedures, and the equivalence of 
several other variations in the proof procedure that should be useful in practice. 
4.1. The Standard Proof Procedure 
The main components of the standard proof procedure are illustrated in Figures 1 
and 2 below. Each proof begins with an initial tableau, labeled YO, which is then 
extended into a system of auxiliav tableaux labeled .7i, _7*, etc. Each tableau is 
divided into at most four sections: (1) a section at the top containing one, or 
possibly two, principal refutation trees; (2) an optional section containing a set of 
subordinate refutation trees; (3) an optional rule base containing a set of rules; and 
(4) a data base containing a set of atomic formulae. A refutation tree in either of the 
top two sections of the tableau is a simple And/Or refutation tree [24, 251 as 
described in Section 2 (Paper I), but some of the variables in these trees have special 
prefixes. A variable with a prefix ‘!’ is called an existential variable, and a variable 
with a prefix ‘?’ is called a local tableau variable. At the beginning of the proof, the 
initial tableau will have the query P(x) at the top of its principal refutation tree and 
the substate s,, in its data base, but nothing more. As the proof proceeds, the 
refutation trees will be extended, the various auxiliary tableaux will be constructed, 
and the answer substitutions will be computed and returned to the appropriate 
nodes in the trees. An individual refutation tree will close with an answer substitu- 
tion at its topmost node, exactly as it does in the Horn-clause case, but in addition 
an auxiliary tableau will close with an answer substitution for its local variables ?x 
whenever the principal refutation tree in the tableau closes. Finally, if the principal 
refutation tree in the initial tableau Y0 closes with an answer substitution u, we will 
say that the entire system of tableaux is closed with answer substitution CT, and the 
proof will be complete. 
The key point in understanding these proofs is to understand the construction of 
the auxiliary tableaux, and the role of the special prefixed variables. The basic 
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procedure is this: Whenever a node in one of the refutation trees unifies with the 
left-hand side of a rule in the form P e= -,Q or P e= [ Q * R], we apply the unifying 
substitution u to the right-hand side of the rule and we construct a new auxiliary 
tableau with the formula Q(x;y)a added to its data base. In this step, all free 
variables from the left-hand side of the rule are given the prefix ‘?‘, and all variables 
that appear only on the right-hand side of the rule are given the prefix ‘!‘. Then, in 
all subsequent unification steps, these prefixed variables must be treated specially. 
The existential variables !y are treated as constants, and cannot be bound to any 
other term. The local tableau variables ?x are more complex. These variables are 
treated as true variables in all unification steps, but they are never renamed, and 
they are subject to two restrictions: 
(1) 
(2) 
All substitutions for the variables ?x must be carried down along the 
branches of the refutation tree, and all subsequent bindings for these vari- 
ables must be consistent with the original substitutions. This means that we 
always compute the unifying composition [28] [4] with respect to the local 
tableau variables. 
A local tableau variable ‘?xi’ may not be bound to a term containing an 
existential variable ‘!yj’ that was created in the same tableau in which ‘?x;’ 
was created, or in a htgher level tableau. 
This last restriction is similar to the usual restrictions on “eigenvariables” in natural 
deduction proofs, and closely related to the use of Skolem functions in resolution 
proofs (for example, see [3, Chapter IV.81). 
A final rule governs the closure of the auxiliary tableaux: Whenever one of the 
principal refutation trees in an auxiliary tableau closes with an answer substitution 
at its topmost node, we collect all of the bindings for the local tableau variables that 
are included in this answer substitution, we strip the ‘?’ prefixes from those variables 
that were originally created in that particular auxiliary tableau, and we return the 
resulting substitution to the node in the lower-level tableau from which the auxiliary 
tableau was generated. From then on, the stripped variables are treated as ordinary 
variables, without special prefixes. 
For a better understanding of these rules, we will analyze two concrete examples 
of the standard proof procedure in operation. The rationale for the various steps in 
the procedure will be explained as the proof is constructed. 
Example 4.1. This example is the same as Example 3.17 in Section 3.4, except 
that we will now develop systematically a proof that ‘PI(a)’ is true in all substates 
that satisfy the rules. Assume that .G&’ consists of the following: 
PI(X) - ~QI(x, Y>, (1) 
P*(x) - -Q&G Y), (2) 
Qh Y> - 3(x, y, 4 (3) 
Q,b, Y)-+, Y, ~1, (4) 
and assume that the initial substate sa = {P,(a)}. Let ‘P,(x,)?’ be the query. We 
would expect the proof to return an answer substitution u : {a + x0}, which it does. 
The standard proof procedure for this example is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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T 0 
Answer: (0 + x,1 
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II 
,nswer; ia + 7x,) 
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F 
Q,(a, YJ 
U: {a + x,1 
{Y3 + YJ II 
L 
4nswer: (a t ?x,, !Y, c ?y3 1 
princioal: 
F 
W?x,, !y, , z,) 
0: {a + ?x, 1 
(!y, + ?y3 1 
(!z, + 2,) 
Qata Base; R(a, ?y3, rz,) 
a#$, Y& c= -u R(x,, yI, z,) d 
Subordinate; 
9, (x,, y,J * -, RN+, Y.,, z) 
0: (?x, c x,1 
(!Y, + YJ II 
Q, (?x, , $I,) 
Rule Base: R(?x,, !y,, z) 3 F 
Data Base: a,(?~,, !y,) 
P,(x,) e -0,(x,, Y,) 
Subordinate: 
P,(x,) = - P*(Xz, y) 
0: (a c x,1 
II 
P,(a) 
Rule Base: Cl,(a, y) 2 F 
Data Base: P,(O) 
f 
FIGURE 1. The standard proof procedure for Example 4.1. 
The proof begins with the tableau Y-,. This tableau initially contains a principal 
refutation tree consisting of a single node ‘P,(x,)‘, and a data base consisting of a 
single ground instance ‘P2(a)‘. Normally, the principal refutation tree would be 
extended using rules of the form P eAQj and P =VQj, as indicated schematically 
in Figure 1. However, in this case the node containing ‘P1(xO)’ unifies immediately 
with the left-hand side of the rule(l), producing a unifying substitution (I : {x1 + x,}, 
and so the auxiliary tableau YI is immediately constructed as a successor to .5$. 
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The reason for this is as follows: By our refutation assumption, the initial tableau 
.7,, represents a substate s 2 s,, such that, for every 0, P,(x,)8 4 s. But since the 
rule Pi( xi) = -,Qi(xi, yi) holds in the substate s, we can see from Definition 3.1 
that, for every 8, there must exist some substate s’ 2 s and some ground substitu- 
tion 8’ 2 0 such that Ql(xi, y&3 E s’. This situation is represented by the auxiliary 
tableau Yi, which has the formula ‘Q,(?x,, !yJ in its data base, and which has a 
principal refutation tree at the top beginning with F. Since the symbol F stands for 
an absolute contradiction, the refutation assumption has now been reduced to the 
proposition that ri is noncontradictory. Accordingly, if the refutation tree begin- 
ning with F eventually closes, with some answer substitution 6, we will have a proof 
of the contrary proposition and a binding for the variable ‘?xi’. Note that the 
substate s’ and the substitution 8’ depend, in the refutation assumption, on 
the substitution 8, and this explains the special restrictions we have imposed on the 
bindings of the variable ‘?xi’. 
But how can a refutation tree beginning with F ever close? To see this, we need to 
examine the subordinate refutation tree associated with the rule (2) in the tableau 
TO. Basically, subordinate refutation trees generate lemmas from rules of the form 
P - 7Q, and they may be constructed at any time in any tableau in which they 
might prove useful. (There is a question of nondeterminism here, of course, which 
we will investigate later; see Section 4.6.) In this case, the node ‘P2(x,)’ unifies with 
the ground instance ‘P2(a)’ in the tableau Ya, producing the unifying substitution 
u: {a +x2}, and so this substitution is applied to the right-hand side of (2) to 
create the rule ‘Q,(u, y) * F’. This new rule is then added to the rule base of 99, 
and it is made available for the extension of any principal refutation tree in .Y& or 
in any higher-level tableau, beginning with F. The reason for this is as follows: 
When the subordinate refutation tree in TO closes with the answer substitution 
u : {a + x2}, it means that P,(u) E s, and it then follows from the rule (2) and from 
Definition 3.1 that Q,(u, y)O’ 4 s’ for every s’ 2 s and for every ground substitu- 
tion 8’. But this situation can be represented by putting the formula ‘Q,(u, yJ into 
an open node of a principal refutation tree in Ye, and in all higher-level tableaux, 
and making this part of the refutation assumption. In Figure 1, the rule ‘Qz(u, y) 
3 F’ has been used to extend the principal refutation tree in Yi beginning with F, 
and so if this tree eventually closes with an answer substitution (I, we will know that 
there exists no substate s’ 2 s containing ‘Q,(?x,, !_~,)a’. 
To see if this is the case, the same basic steps are now repeated in the tableau Yi. 
The open node in the principal refutation tree containing ‘Q,(u, y2)) unifies 
immediately with the left-hand side of (4), producing a unifying substitution 
e:{a+x,, Y, +y2}. Applying this substitution to the right-hand side of the rule, 
the proof procedure now constructs a new tableau Yz with a data base containing 
the formula ‘R( a,?~,, !z,)‘. As before, for every instantiation of the variable ‘?y3’, 
this new tableau represents a substate s” 2 s’ such that ‘R(u,?y,, !zs)’ is true in s” 
for some instantiation of the variable ‘!z,‘. The rule (3) now generates a subordinate 
refutation tree in Yi, which is treated exactly like the subordinate refutation tree in 
Ya, except that there is an additional formula in the data base of Yi that can unify 
with the branches of the tree. Note that the subordinate refutation tree associated 
with the rule (3) could also have been constructed in the tableau .Y& except that the 
construction would not have closed there. In this case, however, the node of the tree 
containing ‘Ql(xq, y4)) unifies immediately with the formula ‘Q,(?x,, !y,)’ in the 
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data base of .9-i, producing an answer substitution CJ : {?xl + x4, !y, +-y4}. Apply- 
ing this answer substitution to the right-hand side of (3) the proof procedure 
constructs a new rule ‘R(?x,, !yl, z) - F’ which is then added to the rule base of 
Y1. The meaning of this rule is similar to the meaning of the rule in the rule base of 
TO, but more complex. Whatever value has been assigned to ‘?xl’ and ‘!y,’ in the 
substate s’, the rule says, ‘R(?x,, !yl, z)’ is not true for every instantiation of the 
variable ‘z ’ in every substate s” 2 s’. 
Next, continuing the proof procedure in the tableau Y2, we can see that the 
refutation trees close properly at this level, and that the correct answer substitutions 
are computed for the local tableau variables ‘?xi’ and ‘?y,‘. The principal refutation 
tree in Y2 beginning with F includes the open node ‘R(?x,, !yi, zJ, and this node 
unifies immediately with the formula ‘R( a,?~,, !z3)’ in the data base, producing the 
answer substitution u : {a + ?xi, !yi + ?y3, !z, + z4}. Recall the restrictions im- 
posed on the bindings of the local tableau variables ‘?xi’ and ‘?yj’. First, the 
unification at this node must be a unifying composition with respect to the local 
tableau variables, but this causes no problems in the present case because ‘?xi’ and 
‘?y3’ have not yet acquired any bindings. Second, the variable ‘?ys’ must not be 
bound to an existential variable that was created in the tableau .Y2, or in any 
higher-level tableau, but this causes no problems in the present case because the 
variable ‘!y,’ was created in .?i. Thus the principal refutation tree closes, correctly, 
with the answer substitution u : {a + ?xi, !y, + ?y3, !z, + z4}. This means that Y2 
itself closes with an answer substitution for the local tableau variables ‘?xi’ and 
‘?yj’, as indicated in Figure 1. 
Finally, since ‘?xi’ and ‘?y3’ were originally created in Yi and Y2, respectively, 
the answer substitution for these variables must be returned to the nodes that 
generated them. First, the prefix ‘?’ is stripped from the variable ‘?y3’. The resulting 
substitution u : {a + ?x,, !y, + y3} is then returned to the node containing 
‘Q2( a, y2)’ and composed with the unifying substitution at that node, producing the 
answer substitution u : {a + ?x,, !yi +- y2}. This substitution is then passed up to 
the top of the principal refutation tree in Yi. But this means that the tableau Y1 
itself is now closed, and that the answer substitution u : { a + ?xl } must likewise be 
returned to the node in TO that generated it. Again, the prefix “7’ is stripped from 
the variable ‘?xi’, and the resulting substitution is composed with the unifying 
substitution u : {x1 + x0} at the node containing ‘P,(x,)‘. At this point, though, the 
principal refutation tree in Y’ closes, too, with the answer substitution u : {a +- x,, }, 
and we finally receive a response to our query. Putting everything together, we have 
constructed a proof of the ground atomic formula ‘PI(u)’ from sO and 5%‘. 
Example 4.2. We now consider a slightly more complex example, which includes 
function symbols and which involves a combination of various types of rules. 
Assume that 5%’ consists of the following: 
p,(x) e [Q,k Y) - Rbv g(d)] 7 (5) 
P,(x) * --Qkdd f(y)), (6) 
Q,b, Y)-= [Q&t Y) =-k Y>], (7) 
R(x, g(y)) t= Q,(_f(d, Y) * Q,k ~1, (8) 
and assume that the initial substate s,, = {P,(a)}. It turns out that the ground 
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instance ‘Pl( f( g( a)))’ is entailed by sa and 9 in this case. In fact, if we apply the 
transformation TN successively to Jo, as we did in the examples in Section 3.4, we 
can show that nTk(J,) converges after two iterations to 
nR* = nT:(Jd = { f’,(d f’,(f(gb)))}. 
Thus, the query ‘P,(x,)?’ ought to succeed with an answer substitution u : { f( g( a)) 
+ x0}. Let us see if this is the case. 
The standard proof procedure for Example 4.2 is illustrated in Figure 2. The 
tableau Y0 initially contains a principal refutation tree consisting of a single node 
‘P1(xO)), and a data base consisting of a single ground instance ‘P*(a)‘. However, 
the node containing ‘P,(x,)’ unifies immediately with the left-hand side of (5) 
producing a unifying substitution u : {x1 + x0}, and so the auxiliary tableau Yi is 
immediately constructed as a successor to 9& The reason for this is as follows: By 
our refutation assumption, the initial tableau Y0 represents a substate s 2 s0 such 
that, for every 8, Pi( xi)0 4 s. But since the rule P1( xi) = [ Qt(xr, yi) j R(x,, g( y,))] 
holds in the substate s, we can see from Definition 3.2 that, for every 8, there must 
exist some substate s’ 2 s and some ground substitution 8’ 2 6 such that 
Qi(xi, y1)8’ E s’ and R(x,, g(_vi))e’ %Z s’. Up to this point, the analysis is similar to 
the analysis of the negation rule in Example 4.1, but there are now two ways for the 
tableau Y1 to close. First, the principal refutation tree in Yi beginning with F 
could close, exactly as it did in Example 4.1 (Note: This tree has been omitted from 
Figure 2 because of a lack of space.) Second the principal refutation tree in Y1 
beginning with ‘R(?x,, g(!yt))’ could close, with some answer substitution u for the 
variable ‘?xi’. In this latter case, we would know that any substate s’ 2 s containing 
‘Ql(?x l,!yl)a’ must also contain ‘R(?x,, g(!yi))u’, and thus ‘P(?x,)u’ would be 
true in s by the rule (5). 
To see if this is the case, the proof procedure now continues in the tableau .7i. 
Here, the node containing ‘R(?x,, g(!ri))’ unifies immediately with the left-hand 
side of (8), producing the unifying substitution u : {?xl +- x3, !y, +- y3}. The rule (8) 
is an ordinary Horn clause, of course, so the substitution is applied to each of the 
conjuncts and the proof continues. (Recall that we are using And/Or refutation 
trees, by convention, instead of SLD refutation trees.) The left conjunct unifies 
immediately with the formula in the data base of Yi, producing the unifying 
substitution u : { f( zl) + ?xl}, and the right conjunct unifies with the left-hand side 
of (7), producing the unifying substitution u : { z1 + x4, ?x, + y4}. This means that 
the proof procedure must now construct another auxiliary tableau Yz. Applying the 
substitution u : { z1 + x4, ?x, +y4} to the right-hand side of (7), the embedded 
implication becomes ‘Q,(z,, ?x,) * R(zt,?xi)‘, and so the free variable ‘zi’ is 
converted into a new local tableau variable ‘?zi’. Thus the new tableau Yz has the 
formula ‘Q3(?zt,?x1)) in its data base, and it contains two principal refutation trees: 
a refutation tree beginning with the node ‘R(?z,, ?x,)‘, and a refutation tree 
beginning with F. 
Now one way to continue the proof in the tableau Z$ is to expand the principal 
refutation tree beginning with ‘R(?z,,?x,)‘. But another way to continue the proof is 
to expand the principal refutation tree beginning with F. Where does this tree come 
from? To see this, we have to return to the tableau 9& where a subordinate 
refutation tree has been constructed for the rule (6). Here the analysis is identical to 
the analysis in Example 4.1. The node ‘P2(x2)) unifies with the ground instance 
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FIGURE 2. The standard proof procedure for Example 4.2. 
‘Pz( a)’ in FO, producing the unifying substitution u : {a + x2}, and so this substitu- 
tion is applied to the right-hand side of (6) to create the new rule Q3( g( a), f(y)) * F. 
This new rule is then added to the rule base of YO, and it is made available for the 
extension of any principal refutation tree in .9& or in any higher-level tableau, 
beginning with F. The reason for this is as follows: When the subordinate refutation 
tree closes in TO with the answer substitution u : { a + x2 }, it means that P2( a) E S, 
and it then follows from (6) and from Definition 3.1 that Q,(g(a), f(y))& 4 s’ for 
every s’ 2 s and for every ground substitution 8’. 
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In the present proof, in fact, the tableau Yz closes precisely because of the rule 
‘Q,( g( a), f(y)) * F’. The formula ‘Q,( g( a), f( y2))) unifies immediately with the 
data base of Yz, producing the unifying substitution u : {g(a) + ?zt, f(y2) + ?xi}, 
and thus the principal refutation tree beginning with F is closed. The bindings of the 
local tableau variables are now collected in Fz, and the proof procedure begins to 
return them to the lower-level tableaux. Since ‘?z,’ was created in Yz, its prefix is 
stripped away as the answer substitution is returned from Yz to Yi, but the prefix 
on the variable ‘?xr’ is retained. Back in the tableau Yr, the answer substitution 
c:{g(a)+z,, f( y2) + ?x, } arrives at the ‘And’ node that was originally created by 
the rule (S), and the proof procedure computes its unifying composition with the 
substitution u : { f(zi) + ?xr}. The answer is u : { f(g(u)) + ?xl, g(u) + zl, g(u) 
+ _y, }. Since the principal refutation tree in the tableau Yi has now closed, the 
proof procedure returns the answer substitution o : { f( g( a)) + ?xl} to the tableau 
9& stripping away the last remaining ‘? prefix in the process. It is now obvious that 
the principal refutation tree in YO will also close, with answer substitution 
(I : { f( g( a)) + x0}, and thus the proof is complete. 
It is instructive to examine the one remaining open tree in this proof, to see why 
it does not also lead to closure. Notice that the node R(?z,,?xi) in the principal 
refutation tree in the tableau Yz unifies with the left-hand side of (8) producing an 
‘And’ node. Now it might appear that the left conjunct Q,( f( z2), ys) should unify 
with the formula Q,(?x,, !y,) in the data base of the tableau Yi. However, this 
unification would violate our restrictions on the bindings of the variable ‘?xr’ for 
two reasons: First, the prior substitution u : { g(y,) +- ?xi} would be carried down 
to this conjunct, and the original binding for ‘?xi’ would then conflict with the 
substitution u : { f( z2) + ?xl} which otherwise results from the unification step. 
Second, if ‘y,’ were bound to ‘!yr’ as a result of the unification step, then ‘?xi’ 
would be bound to ‘g(!y,)‘, which is prohibited. The simplest way to enforce these 
restrictions is to write down the terms and the prior substitution as follows: 
and then attempt to unify the bracketed expressions. In this case, the attempted 
unification fails. Hopefully, an implementation of our proof procedure would detect 
this failure early, because otherwise, as Figure 2 indicates, the right conjunct in the 
tableau Y1 could very well generate an infinite sequence of auxiliary tableaux. The 
lesson here, as in the Horn-clause case, is that the mere existence of a closed system 
of tableaux does not guarantee that an arbitrary ordering of the proof procedure 
will terminate in finite time. 
4.2. The Simplified Proof Procedure 
Although the standard proof procedure is intended for most practical computations 
in clausal intuitionistic logic, it is awkward to use the procedure directly in the 
proofs of the soundness and completeness theorems. We will thus introduce in this 
section a simplified proof procedure, with a greater degree of homogeneity, which is 
easier to analyze. 
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There are two main differences between the standard and the simplified proof 
procedures: First, in the simplified proof procedure, the negation rules P * 7Q 
generate principal refutation trees directly, as if they were Horn clauses in the form 
Fe P(x) A Q(x; y). Thus, there are no subordinate refutation trees, and there is no 
rule base, in a simplified tableau. However, the principal refutation trees beginning 
with F can be constructed at any time, in any tableau, for any negation rule 
P * 7Q, and they therefore tend to proliferate wildly. Second, in the simplified 
proof procedure, an auxiliary tableaux z;’ can be constructed for any rule P -=-Q 
or P (=[Q * R], at any time, even if the formula P(x) on the left-hand side of the 
rule has not yet unified with a node J(r in one of the refutation trees in 5. Thus, 
instead of attaching an auxiliary tableau to a particular node N, with a particular 
unifying substitution, as in the standard proof procedure, the simplified proof 
procedure attaches the auxiliary tableau directly to the base tableau q, and returns 
a general answer formula when the auxiliary tableau closes. Again, this procedure 
could easily lead to a wild proliferation of auxiliary tableaux. 
For an illustration of these differences, the simplified proof procedure for 
Example 4.1 is shown in Figure 3. The reader should compare this figure with 
Figure 1. The two subordinate refutation trees in Figure 1 have been replaced in 
Figure 3 by the two principal refutation trees for the rules Fe P2(x2) A Q,(x,, y2) 
and F* Q1(x.,, y4) A R(x,, y,, z4). Also, the tableau .& is associated with the 
generic rule Q,(x,, ys) e 7R(~3, y,, zs) in Figure 3, instead of being specialized by 
the unifying substitution u : {a + x3 }, as it was in Figure 1. Thus, when Y2 closes 
in Figure 3, the answer formula ‘Qz(?xi, !yJ is returned to .7i, where it subse- 
quently unifies with the formula ‘Q2(x2, yJ. The answer substitution u : {a + ?xI} 
does not appear in Figure 3 until the unifying composition is computed for the 
‘And’ node in the principal refutation tree in Yi. Figure 3 also shows the many 
superfluous auxiliary tableaux that can be generated by the simplified proof proce- 
dure. For example, Ys is constructed as an auxiliary tableau to 9& but it never 
closes, and, even if it did close, its answer formula would never unify with the nodes 
of the principal refutation tree in .9& 
Despite these practical complications, the simplified proof procedure is a much 
more tractable theoretical construct han the standard proof procedure. We will now 
state rigorously the rules governing the construction of these proofs. At each step, 
the proof procedure identifies (nondeterministically) a tableau Y in the current 
system of tableaux, and it executes (nondeterministically) one of the applicable 
rules to construct an updated system of tableaux. Recall that there are five kinds 
of expressions in our language: P =AQj, P =VQj, Pj7Q, P e7Q, and 
P c= [Q - R]. Each of these expressions has associated with it a tableau extension 
step and a tableau closure step, as follows: 
Rules P =hQj and P +VQj: 
Extension: If any node N in any refutation tree in the tableau Y unifies 
with the left-hand side P(x) of any rule in the form P *AQj or P -VQ,, 
extend the node JY with an ‘And’ branch or an ‘Or’ branch, accordingly, as 
in the pure Horn-clause case. 
Closure: If any node N in any refutation tree in the tableau Y unifies with 
an atomic formula in the data base of .7, or in the data base of any 
predecessor of Y, add the unifying substitution to the node JY as one of its 
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Principal: 
Data Base: a, (?x,, !y,) 
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P,(a) 
Data Base: P,(a) 
Rule: Q,(x,, y5) = -o Nx,, yg, 2,) 
yZ?L 
Answer 
Formula 
FIGURE 3. The simplified proof procedure for Example 4.1 
answer substitutions. Similarly, if any node X in any refutation tree in the 
tableau .T unifies with an answer formula (see below) returned from an 
auxiliary tableau attached to .T, add the unifying substitution to the node 
JV as one of its answer substitutions. For nodes that have been extended 
into ‘And’ branches or ‘Or’ branches, propagate the answer substitutions 
back up the refutation tree exactly as in the pure Horn-clause case, using 
unifying compositions as necessary. 
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Rules P +. -,Q: 
Extension: For any rule in the form P(x) * -,Q(x; y) that has not yet been 
extended in the tableau 7, construct a principal refutation tree in Y 
beginning with F and extend it to an ‘And’ branch including the formulae 
P(x) and Q(x;y). In this construction, the variables x and y must be 
uniquely renamed. 
Closure: Whenever an answer substitution u is propagated back to a node 
containing F in tableau Y’, we will say that the principal refutation tree in 
.Y beginning with F has closed with answer substitution u. 
Rules P c= -,Q and P=[Q-R]: 
Extension: For any rule in the form P(x) * 7Q(x; y) or P(x) = [Q(x; y) * 
R(x; y)] that has not yet been extended in the tableau Y, construct a new 
auxiliary tableau 7’ and attach it to Y. In this construction, the variables 
x and y must be uniquely renamed. Consider the atomic formula Q(x; y) 
from the right-hand side of the rule. Proceed as follows: Replace every 
variable ‘yi’ with an existential variable ‘!y,‘, replace every variable ‘xl’ with 
a local tableau variable ‘?xi’, and add the modified formula Q(?x; !y) to the 
data base of 9’. In the case of a rule P = [Q * R], replace the variables of 
R(x; y) in the same way, and construct a principal refutation tree in .7’ 
with the modified formula R(?x; !y) at its topmost node. 
Closure: Notice that the principal refutation trees in the auxiliary tableau .7’ 
come in two varieties: Some begin with R(?x; !y), and some begin with F. 
But whenever a principal refutation tree of either variety closes with an 
answer substitution u’, we will say that the auxiliary tableau .7’ is closed 
with answer substitution u’. The substitution u’ may contain ?x variables 
that were created in Y’, as well as ?x variables that were created in ._7 and 
its predecessors, as well as ordinary variables without prefixes. Proceed as 
follows: Strip the ‘?’ prefix from all the ?x variables that were created in 
Y’, and denote the resulting substitution by (I. If P(x) is the atomic 
formula on the left-hand side of the rule that generated the auxiliary 
tableau Y’, we will refer to P(x)u as the answer formula returned from the 
tableau Y’. Finally, if JV is any node in any refutation tree in Y that 
unifies with P(x)u, add the unifying substitution to Jlr as one of its answer 
substitutions. 
In all of these steps, of course, the variables ?x and !y are treated specially. The !y 
variables are treated as constants, and the ?x variables are subject to the following 
two restrictions: 
(1) All substitutions for the ?x variables must be carried down along the 
branches of the refutation trees, and every unification step in the proof must 
be a unifying composition with respect o these variables. 
(2) A local tableau variable ‘?xi’ may not be bound to a term containing an 
existential variable ‘!yj’ that was created in the same tableau in which ‘?xi’ 
was created, or in a higher-level tableau. 
Note that these are exactly the same restrictions imposed in the standard proof 
procedure. 
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4.3. Soundness 
In this subsection, we will prove the soundness theorem for clausal intuitionistic 
logic, assuming that all proofs are constructed according to the simplified proof 
procedure. As in the pure Horn-clause case, we must assume that the individual 
constants in the query P(x) and the rules 9 also appear in the initial substate sO. 
The soundness theorem can then be stated as a close paraphrase of Theorem 2.17. 
Theorem 4.3 (Soundness). Let sO be a (possibly infinite) initial substate in B, and let 
9 be a (possibly injinite) set of rules including negations and embedded implica- 
tions. Assume that the individual constants in P(x) and 92 appear in s,,, and assume 
that there exists a closed system of tableaux for P(x) with answer substitution o. 
Then (3x)P(x) is uniformly entailed by s,, and 9 with some ground substitution 8
such that a(x) I 8. 
The basic idea of the proof is to convert a closed system of tableaux into a finite 
sequence of applications of TN to JO. Intuitively, a tableau 7 that has no closed 
auxiliary tableaux extending from it represents the set of substates in JO, and an 
answer formula that is returned to the predecessor of Y represents a ground 
instance in llT,(J,). For a concrete illustration of this correspondence between the 
auxiliary tableaux in a proof and the operators Tk in the semantics, the reader 
should compare the proof procedures in Figures 1 and 3 with the semantic analysis 
of the same set of rules in Example 3.17. Note that the tableau Yz in Figures 1 and 
3 corresponds to the set J,,, the tableau Yi corresponds to the set T,(J,), and the 
tableau Ye corresponds to the set Ti(J,). 
To formalize this idea, it will be helpful to establish some additional terminology. 
Let us focus on a particular closed system of tableaux for the duration of the proof. 
Consider any answer substitution u at any node X in any tableau 7 in this closed 
system of tableaux. The answer substitution u must have resulted from the closure 
of a (possibly empty) refutation tree constructed out of a finite set of rules P =AQj 
and P G= VQ,, including (possibly) a special rule in the form F * P(x) A Q(x; y). Let 
us identify the specific branches of the refutation tree that produced the answer 
substitution u, and let us call this the nrle dependency tree for u. Note that each 
branch of this rule dependency tree must terminate in either: (1) a ground instance 
m se, or a Horn clause P(x) e= with a null antecedent; (2) a data-base formula 
Q(?x; !y) in .Y or one of its predecessors; or (3) an answer formula P(x)0 returned 
from one of the auxiliary tableaux attached to Y. 
In addition to the concept of a rule dependency tree, we will need the related 
concept of a tableau dependency tree. Consider any node N in the rule dependency 
tree for u. If X terminates in an answer formula returned from an auxiliary tableau 
Y’, as in case (3) above, then an answer substitution at M wilI be said to depend on 
the closure of the tableau Y’, or to depend on the closure of one of the principal 
refutation trees in Y’, which is an equivalent statement. Since the answer substitu- 
tions in the nodes of the principal refutation tree in .P might in turn depend on the 
closure of further auxiliary tableaux, we can define the tableaux dependency tree for 
u in the obvious way. We will then define the degree of the answer substitution u by 
reference to the depth of this tableaux dependency tree: If the rule dependency tree 
for u contains no nodes whose answer substitution depends on the closure of an 
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auxiliary tableau, then u has degree 0. But if CJ is an answer substitution at a node 
M that depends on the closure of a principal refutation tree in the auxiliary tableau 
Y’, and if the degree of the answer substitution at the top of this principal 
refutation tree is n, then the degree of u is n + 1. Finally, for an arbitrary u at an 
arbitrary node N, we will define the degree of u to be equal to the maximum 
degree of the answer substitutions in its rule dependency tree. Since the entire 
system of tableaux is finite, it is obvious that the tableau dependency tree for u is 
finite, and that it must terminate in a set of rule dependency trees whose answer 
substitutions all have degree 0. 
Working with these definitions, we will now establish a soundness lemma for 
tableau dependency trees. In this lemma, when we refer to an atomic formula 
P,,(?x,; !yO; z) in a particular tableau 9, we are using the variable ?x, to denote the 
set of all ?x variables in .? and its predecessors, and we are using the variable !ya to 
denote the set of all !y variables in 7 and its predecessors. The new variables 
created in an auxiliary tableau attached to Y will then be denoted by ?x, and !yI, 
respectively. With this notation, the soundness lemma is stated as follows: 
Lemma 4.4. Consider a tableau 7, and a node J1’ in 3r that contains an atomic 
formula P,(?x,; !y,; z) and an answer substitution u of degree k. Consider also any 
substate s E Tk(J,) that includes the individual constants in P(x) and .4?, and 
satisJies the following condition: We collect all the data-base formulae Q(?x,; !yO) in 
F and its predecessors, we instantiate the variables ?x, and !yO to any arbitrary 
ground terms consistent with u, and we require that these instantiated data-base 
formulae be contained in the substate s. Let 0 be any ground substitution that 
includes these instantiations of the variables ?x, and !yO, and further instantiates 
the remaining free variables (if any) in P,,(?x,; !y,,; z)u to some ground terms in 
U(s) consistent with u. Then it follows that PO(?xO; !yO; z)u 0 8 E s. 
PROOF. The proof of Lemma 4.4 is by induction on the degree k. For the case 
k = 0, the rule dependency tree for u contains no nodes whose answer substitution 
depends on the closure of an auxiliary tableau, and the conclusion of the lemma 
follows directly from the soundness of Horn-clause refutation. We need only 
consider specifically the branches of the rule dependency tree that terminate in 
nodes containing the data base formulae Q(?x,,; !yO). For these branches, by the 
conditions of Lemma 4.4, the variables ?x, and !yO have been instantiated to some 
ground terms consistent with u, and the instantiated formulae Q(?x,; !yO) have been 
included in the substate s. Since the answer substitution u has been computed using 
unifying compositions on the variables ?x,, however, we can replace the variables 
?x, and !y,, throughout the rule dependency tree with their corresponding ground 
terms, and we are guaranteed that the unifications will still go through. Thus, by 
Lemma 2.15 in the proof of Theorem 2.17 (soundness), it follows that 
P,(?x,; !y(); z)u 0 8 E s. 
Now assume that Lemma 4.4 has been established for all answer substitutions of 
degree less than k. Consider any branch of any rule dependency tree in Y that 
terminates in an answer formula P,(x,)u,, and assume that the substitution ur 
results from the closure of an auxiliary tableau 9 with an answer substitution ui of 
degree less than k. We observe that the substitution UI may contain the variables 
?x, and !yO from 7 and its predecessors, as well as additional free variables z 
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without prefixes, and that it is identical to the substitution a; except that the prefix 
‘?’ has been removed from all variables ?x, appearing in 0;. (Note that the stripped 
variables x1 will then be included among the free variables z in al.) Let s E T$(J,,) 
be any substate that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 4.4. In other words, assume 
that s contains the data-base formulae Q(?x,; !ya) with the variables ?x, and !y,, 
instantiated to some arbitrary ground terms consistent with ut. Then, if 8, is any 
further ground instantiation of the variables in P,(x,)a, restricted to U(s) and 
consistent with ui, we wish to show that P,(xr)u, 0 8, ES. Equivalently, assuming 
that 6’; is identical to 8i but with all its x1 variables replaced by ?x, variables, we 
will show that P,(?x,)u; 0 0; E s. 
We will first consider the case in which the auxiliary tableau y’ has been 
constructed by the extension of a negation rule P,(x,) * 7Q,(x,; yi), so that the 
formula Q,(?x,; !yi) has been added to the data base of 7’. (Recall that x1 and yr 
are distinct new variables that have not previously appeared in r or its predeces- 
sors.) Since the substate s E Tk(J,) is also a member of Ti-‘(J,), we will use 
Definition 3.5 to apply the operator TN to T&‘(J,) and thereby compute the 
ground instances in s. In particular, we will show that the first condition of 
Definition 3.5 holds in T&‘(J,,) by a reductio ad absurdum: Pick any arbitrary 
ground substitution $ for the variables in !yi, and assume that there exists some 
s’ 2 s in Ti-‘(J,) such that Q,(?x,; !yl)ur’ 0 0; 0 1c/ E s’. We will show that this 
assumption leads to a contradiction. The reader should note here the importance of 
the restrictions imposed on the substitution a; within our unification procedure. It 
is only because the variables ?x, and ?x, cannot be bound to terms containing the 
variables !yr that we can always pick a substitution J, independently of u{ 0 &, and 
thus establish the first condition of Definition 3.5 for all possible instantiations of 
lYr* 
It should now be apparent hat we can apply the induction hypothesis of Lemma 
4.4 to the substate s’ E Tk-‘(J,) f o our reductio assumption. Since s’ 2 s, the 
ground instantiations of the data-base formulae in 7 and its predecessors, which 
were assumed to be included in s, must also be included in s’. Since 
Q,<?x 1; !ylju; .ep 4 ES’ by the reductio assumption, and since ai 0 8; 0 I/ is 
consistent with a;, we see that s’ also includes a consistent ground instantiation of 
the data base formula in y’. Finally, we observe that the principal refutation tree in 
.7’ that closed with the answer substitution a; must have been constructed from a 
rule in the form F= P2(x2) A Q,(x,; y2), derived from a negation rule P2(x2) * 
7Qz(x2; y2), and thus the nodes P2(x2) and Qz(x2; y2) must have closed with a pair 
of answer substitutions whose unifying composition is a;. But we can now apply the 
induction hypothesis of Lemma 4.4 directly to each of these nodes. It is then easy to 
see, under all of these assumptions, that there must exist some ground substitution 
e2 such that P2(x& and Q2(xz; y2)& are both contained in the substate s’, which 
contradicts the fact that the set T$-‘(J,) satisfies the rule P2(x2) d ,Q,(x,; Yz). 
Our reductio argument is now complete, and we conclude that the first condition of 
Definition 3.5 holds for the substate s in TN k-l(J,,). Since s is preserved by the 
application of TN to Tr!-‘(J,), it follows that P,(?x,)u{ 0 6; E s. 
We will now consider the case in which the auxiliary tableau y has been 
constructed by the extension of some embedded implication rule P,(x,)e 
[Qi(xi; yr) = R,(x,; y,)], so that y’ includes a principal refutation tree beginning 
with the formula R,(?x,; !yl). The analysis here is very similar to the analysis of the 
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negation rule, except that we must now show that the second condition of Definition 
3.5 holds for s considered as a substate of T$-‘(J,). If the answer substitution a; 
resulted from the closure of the principal refutation tree in Y’ beginning with the 
formula R,(?x,; !yi), then this conclusion follows directly from our induction 
hypothesis. For if 0; is a ground substitution for the variables in P,(?xi)a; 
restricted to the terms in U(s), and if 4 is an arbitrary ground substitution for the 
variables in !yi, and if Qi(?xi; !yi)a; 0 0,lo Ic, ES’ for some s’ 2 s in Tk-‘(J,), then 
the substate s’ satisfies the conditions of the induction hypothesis and it follows 
immediately that R,(?x,; !yi)a; 0 0; 0 \c, E s’. On the other hand, if the answer 
substitution u; resulted from the closure of a principal refutation tree in .7’ 
beginning with F, which is also possible, then the second condition of Definition 3.5 
would hold for s in Tk-‘(J,) by virtue of the same reductio argument as before. In 
either case, we would conclude that P,(?x,)a; 0 0; E s. 
We have now established the conclusion of Lemma 4.4 for any node Nin .7 
that terminates in an answer formula Pi(x of degree k. For the final step of the 
proof, consider any arbitrary node .N in Y that contains a formula P,,(?x,; !y,; z) 
and an answer substitution u of degree k. Assume that the conditions of Lemma 4.4 
are satisfied for some substate s E Tk(J,). Because of the preceding arguments, any 
branch of the rule dependency tree for u that terminates in an answer formula 
P,(x,)ui can now be analyzed in the same way as a branch that terminates in a 
data-base formula Q(?x,; !yO). In particular, since the answer substitution u has 
been computed using unifying compositions on the variables ?x 0, we can replace the 
variables ?x, and !yO throughout he rule dependency tree with their corresponding 
ground terms, and we are guaranteed that the unifications will still go through. 
Thus, by Lemma 2.15 in the proof of Theorem 2.17 (soundness), it follows that 
P,(?x,; !yo; zju o 8 E s. This completes the proof of Lemma 4.4. 0 
With this lemma in hand, the proof of the main theorem is simple. Suppose, first, 
that our system of tableaux is closed because the principal refutation tree for P(x) 
has closed with an answer substitution u in the tableau To. The substitution u must 
have some finite degree: call it m. Since there are no variables of the form ?x or !y 
in To, and since the data base of Y0 consists solely of the ground instances in the 
initial substate q,, Lemma 4.4 reduces to a simple statement: For every substate 
s E T,“(J,) that includes the individual constants in P(x) and 9?, and for every 
ground substitution 8 for the variables in P(x)u restricted to the terms in U(s), 
P(x)a 0 8 E s. Suppose, on the other hand, that our system of tableaux is closed 
because some principal refutation tree in the form Fe= P A Q has closed with an 
answer substitution u of degree m in the tableau .&. In this case, which is the 
degenerate case of an inconsistent set of rules, we can show by the same analysis 
used in our reductio argument above that there exists no substate s in T,“(J,). We 
thus arrive, trivially, at the identical conclusion: For every s E T{(JO), P(x)u 0 8 E s. 
In either case, since K* c T,“(J,), we have established the following result, which 
parallels Lemma 2.15 in the Horn-clause case: 
Lemma 4.5. Let so be a (possibly infinite) initial substate in B, and let 2’ be a 
(possibly injinite) set of rules including negations and embedded implications. 
Assume there exists a closed system of tableaux for P(x) with answer substitution u. 
Then for every substate s E K* that includes the individual constants in P(x) and 9, 
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and for every ground substitution B for the free variables in P(x)a restricted to the 
terms in U(s), it follows that P(x)a 0 8 E s. 
Theorem 4.3 now follows from Lemma 4.5, exactly as in the Horn-clause case. 
Assume that the initial substate s0 includes all the individual constants in P(x) and 
9. If P(x)a is a ground atomic formula, then Lemma 4.5 tells us that P(x)a E llK*. 
Thus (3x)P(x) is uniformly entailed by s,, and 9 with ground substitution a(x). 
Otherwise, if 0 is any ground substitution that binds the free variables in P(x)a to 
the ground terms in U( nK*), then Lemma 4.5 tells us that P(x)u 0 8 E FlK*. Thus 
(3x)P(x) is uniformly entailed by s0 and 9 with ground substitution a(x)0 8. This 
completes the proof of Theorem 4.3. 
4.4. Completeness 
In this subsection, we will prove the completeness theorem for clausal intuitionistic 
logic, assuming again that all proofs are constructed according to the simplified 
proof procedure. For simplicity, we will assume in our statement of the theorem that 
s,, and G%’ are finite, but we will show how to remove this restriction in Section 4.5. 
Otherwise, the completeness theorem can be stated as a close paraphrase of 
Theorem 2.14 in the pure Horn-clause case. 
Theorem 4.6 (Completeness). Let s,, be a finite initial substate in B, and let 93’ be a 
finite set of rules including negations and embedded implications. Assume that 
(3x)P(x) is uniformly entailed by so and 9 with ground substitution 8. Then there 
exists a closed system of tableaux for P(x) with answer substitution u such that 
u(~)5e. 
We will show the contrapositive. We thus let To be an initial tableau for P(x), 
and we assume that there exists no sequence of rule applications starting with Y0 
that results in a closed system of tableaux with an answer substitution u such that 
u(x) I 8. Our objective is to construct a substate s E K* and to show that P(x)8 4 s. 
Under this assumption, let us consider a sequence of rule applications that is fair 
in the following sense: 
Dejinition 4.7. A sequence of rule applications is fair if, at every step in the 
sequence, any rule that is applicable at that step will be executed after only a 
finite number of additional steps. 
It is easy to see that a fair sequence of rule applications exists. For example, since 
the execution of each rule creates at most a finite set of applicable new rules, any 
simple “first in, first out” queueing discipline will suffice. The sequence of systems 
of tableaux generated by these rules will be infinite, in general, and we will proceed 
upon this assumption. Notice that it is only the extension rules for P = TQ and 
P * [Q * R] which create new auxiliary tableaux, and that all other rules simply 
augment the existing tableaux. We can thus identify the particular step in the 
sequence at which each new tableau is created, and we can enumerate the tableaux 
s,, 69% *. ., in this order. In addition, for each tableau z, we can identify the 
immediate predecessor of 3 and the immediate successors of K under the 
operation of the rules P e-Q and P c= [ Q * R]. Obviously, the immediate prede- 
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cessor of K must be created before q can be created, and must therefore also 
precede q in the enumeration. 
Our first step is to construct a set of substates S(n) = { s( n, k) 1 k < w } for each 
of these tableaux z. The set S(0) associated with the initial tableau Y0 will be a 
singleton set containing the substate s(O,O), but the subsequent sets S(n) will be 
infinite in general. To construct the set S(n), for n > 0, it is necessary to assign 
ground terms in U to all variables ?x and !y that appear in the tableaux 
42%. . * 9 3. For existential variables in the form !y this is easy: There is at most 
a denumerable set of these variables, so we pick a denumerable set of individuals 
{ ci} that do not appear in the query P(x), or in any ground instance in s,,, or in any 
rules in 9, and we let JI be any one-to-one mapping from { !y,} to {c;}. Then, when 
we need a substitution for some finite set of existential variables {!y,}, we can 
simply use the mapping 1c, restricted to the finite set. For local tableau variables in 
the form ?x the task is more difficult. We will proceed here, by induction, in the 
order in which the tableaux are created, and define a set of data-base substitutions 
O(n) = { t9(n, k) 1 k < w } to go along with the set of substates S(n) associated with 
each tableau q. 
Since there are no variables in the form ?x in the initial tableau, the data-base 
substitution 6(0,0) associated with the substate s(O,O) in S(0) will be the identity 
mapping. Assume now that the set of substates S(m) has been defined for the 
tableau Ym that is an immediate predecessor of z, and assume that a data-base 
substitution e(rn, j) has been associated with each s(m, j) in S(m). Let a,, be any 
answer substitution that is returned from q to its immediate predecessor Ym at 
any point in the sequence of rule applications as the result of the closure of a 
principal refutation tree beginning with F. If an itself contains existential variables 
in the form ‘!y,‘, we will form the composition of a,, with the mapping JI restricted 
to the finite set of variables {!y,}, and we will let 2, be the set of all such composite 
substitutions a,, 0 4. Now pick any s( m, j) and its associated e( m, j). Let 0, be any 
ground substitution for the new variables in the form ?x that are introduced in the 
tableau 5, but restricted to the terms that can be constructed from the constants in 
s0 and 9, plus the constants ci = #(!yi) for the existential variables ‘!y,’ that were 
introduced in Y, and its predecessors. Consider the composition of fl(m, j) with 
0,. If 6(m, j)o 0, is consistent with one of the substitutions a,, 0 J, in Z,, then we 
will do nothing. On the other hand, if B(m, j)o t3, is not consistent with any of the 
substitutions an 0 $ in Z,, then we will construct a new substate s’ as one of the 
immediate successors of s(m, j) in S(n), and we will let tY( m, j) 0 6, be the 
data-base substitution associated with s’. Clearly, if we can do this for each s(m, j) 
and its associated 8(m, j), and for each f3,,, then we can define the desired sets S(n) 
and O(n) by a simultaneous induction. We note, too, that S(n) and O(n) will 
always be denumerable sets. 
It remains to be seen, though, how the content of each substate in S(n) is to be 
defined. Let us use the expression s’(m, j, 0,) to denote the immediate successor of 
s(m, j) for a particular 8,. We want s’(m, j, fl,) to be the smallest substate 
containing s(m, j) that satisfies the following three conditions: 
(1) Intuitively, we want s’(m, j, 0,) to satisfy the rules P =AQ, and P s=VQj. 
This is straightforward, however, and we simply stipulate that this should be 
the case. 
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(2) 
(3) 
Intuitively, we want s’(m, j, 6,) to include the ground instantiations of the 
data-base formulae in 3 and its predecessors, except for those ground 
instantiations that have been returned as answer substitutions to the im- 
mediate predecessor Ym as the result of the closure of a principal refutation 
tree beginning with F. But the data-base substitution O(m, j) 0 @, has been 
defined with just this purpose in mind. Accordingly, let Q(?x; !y) be the 
formula in the data base of 5, and let # be our existential mapping 
restricted to the variables ‘!y,’ in !y. Then we require that 
Q(?x;!y)$~B(m, j)od,Es’(m, j,O,). 
Finally, we want s’(m, j, 0,) to include all ground instances that are returned 
from the immediate successors of -2; because of the satisfaction of the rules 
P e--,Q and P e= [Q 2 R]. Formally we do this as follows: Let a, be any 
answer substitution returned to z at any point in the sequence of rule 
applications as a result of the closure of an auxiliary tableau that was 
generated by a negation or embedded implication rule with the atomic 
formula P(x) on its left-hand side. Although the prefix ‘?’ will have been 
stripped away from all variables ?x in u, that were created in the auxiliary 
tableau itself, there may be some ?x variables and !y variables remaining in a, 
that were created in < and its predecessors. Let 4 be our existential 
mapping restricted to the variables ‘!y,’ in !y. If O(m, j)o 0, is inconsistent 
with the bindings for ?x in a0 0 I/J, th en we will do nothing. Otherwise, if 
8(m, j)o 0, is consistent with the bindings for ?x in an 0 J/, then form 
P(x)~,o#Oe(m,j)~e,~ 
and interpret this as a Horn clause with a null antecedent that s’(m, j, 6,) 
must satisfy. 
Although these three conditions are formulated for tableaux q with n > 0, they 
reduce to a particularly simple form for the initial tableau YO. We have already 
stipulated that S(0) is the singleton set { ~(0, O}. The first condition simply requires 
that s(O,O) satisfies the rules P - AQj and P =VQj, and the second condition 
requires that s(O,O) contain the initial substate s,,. The third condition is applicable 
as written, except that the substitution Us returned to the tableau Y0 will contain 
no variables in the form ?x or !y, and so the Horn clause with null antecedent 
reduces to P(x)u, - in this case. Since this is exactly the result that we want for 
S(O), we can use these three conditions equally well for both the basis step and the 
inductive step of our definition of S(n). 
It follows, then, that S(n) is well defined if each s’(m, j, 0,) is well defined. Is 
there a unique minimal substate s’(m, j, 0,) 2 s(m, j) that satisfies these three 
conditions? Note that the set of rules constraining s’( m, j, 8,) by the third condition 
could very well be infinite. But all these rules are Horn clauses, and we know that 
Theorem 2.9 holds even if the initial substate s0 and the set of rules W are infinite. 
Thus, by Theorem 2.9, there exists a unique minimal substate s’ 2 s(m, j) that 
satisfies all three conditions. It follows that our construction S(n) = { s(n, k) 1 k < w } 
is well defined for every n. 
We will now establish a completeness lemma for principal refutation trees, using 
a similar idea. Since each s(n, k) is a unique minimal substate generated by a 
CLAUSAL INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC. II 113 
(possibly infinite) set of Horn clauses, we can apply Theorem 2.14 (completeness) to 
construct a finite closed refutation tree for any ground instance in s(n, k). This 
refutation tree can then be used to construct a principal refutation tree in the 
tableau z. The completeness lemma for principal refutation trees is stated as 
follows: 
Lemma 4.8. Assume that P,(?x; !y; zO)J, 0 t9(n, k)o 8 E s(n, k) for some ground sub- 
stitution 8. Then any refutation tree in q beginning with P,,(?x; !y; zO) will 
eventually close with an answer substitution a(zO) for the variables z,, such that 
am I+!I * Bin, k) I 8, and an answer substitution a(?~) for the local tableau 
variables in 3 and its predecessors such that a(?x) 0 9 2 tl( n, k). 
PROOF. Assume that P,,(?x; !y;zO)$ 0 t3(n, k)o 0 E s(n, k) for some ground sub- 
stitution 8. Since P,(?x; !y; zO)+L 0e(n, k) is a formula depending only on za, we 
know from Theorem 2.14 (completeness) that there exists a finite closed refutation 
tree for P,(?x; !y; z,,)# 0 O(n, k) with an answer substitution a’ such that a’&,) I 8. 
Let us call this refutation tree r’. The branches of ‘I” would be constructed from 
rules in the form P I AQj and P eVQ,, and each branch would terminate in 
either: (1) a ground instance in sO, or a Horn clause P(x) = with a null antecedent; 
(2) a ground instance Q(?x; !y)lc/ 0 8(n, k) that was added to s(n, k) by the second 
condition of our construction; or (3) a rule P(x)a, 0 I/J 0 B(n, k)- with a null 
antecedent hat was added by the third condition of our construction. [Note: It is 
possible that the particular rule P(x)a, 0 Ic/ 0 e(n, k) c= was added in some predeces- 
sor of s(n, k), but in this case there would exist an identical rule, with renamed 
variables, that would eventually be added to s(n, k). We may thus assume, without 
loss of generality, that the rule P(x)a, 0 4 0 O(n, k) = was added to s(n, k) because 
of the closure of an auxiliary tableau attached directly to q.1 To prove the lemma, 
we will show that we can systematically “invert” the substitutions e(n, k) and #, 
and replace the ground terms in ‘l” with the original variables ?x and !y. We will 
obtain in this fashion a new refutation tree, call it Yf’, which is composed entirely of 
the rules and the data from < and its predecessors, and which would thus be 
constructed by any fair sequence of rule applications beginning with the node 
P,(?x; !y; zo). 
Consider any arbitrary branch of r’. At the top of this branch, the node 
containing P,(?x; !y; zO)$ 0 B(n, k) must have unified with some formula P,(z,) on 
the left-hand side of one of the rules P -AQ, or P = VQj. Thus, if a; is the 
unifying substitution, we know that 
P,(?x;!y;z,)J, 0 B(n, k)oa; = P,(z,)a;. 
Since B(n, k) includes none of the variables zi, we can rewrite this equality as 
P,(?x;!y;z,)~J~e(n, k)oa;=P,(z,)B(n, k)Oa;, 
from which it is apparent that P,(?x; !y; zO)$ and P,(z,) are unifiable with a most 
general unifier a1 5 8(n, k)o a;. This means that there must exist some substitution 
pi such that 
ulOpl=B(n,k)o$. (9) 
We have thus “inverted” the top node of the refutation tree 71”. 
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Now assume that the selected branch of !I was constructed from a chain of rules 
P --hQj or P =VQj, so that each node contains a formula Qj_i(zj_i)u,‘_, that 
unifies with some formula Pj(zj) from the left-hand side of one of the rules. We 
wish to “invert” each of these nodes, and compute for each formula Qj_ ,(zj_ i)u, _ i 
and each formula Pj(zj) a most general unifier uj, which might very well include ?x 
variables. We thus need to prove that there exists a sequence of most general 
unifiers ui,ur,..., uj along the nodes of our selected branch, such that 
u10p1=8(n,k)+, 
for some substitutions pl, pz, . . . , pj. The proof is by induction. The base case has 
been established in (9) above. So assume that Qj_2(zj_,)uj_, and Pj_l(zj_l) are 
unifiable with a most general unifier a,_,, and assume that 
‘JI-1 ‘Pi_1 = Pj_2 ’ Oj-1 
01) 
for some substitution pj_i. Let Q,_,(z~_,)u;_, be the formula in the next node of 
the selected branch in ‘I”, and assume that Q,_,(z,_,)uj_, unifies with some 
formula P,(zj) from the left-hand side of one of the rules P = AQj or P - VQ,. Let 
uj’ be the unifying substitution at this node in the selected branch of ‘I”. Then 
Qj-l(Zj-l)Ul_,oUj’=Pj(zj)Uj’, 
which can be rewritten as 
Qj_1(~j_1)pj-2 ’ a/_,’ U/ = Pj(Zj)Pj_, ' U/, 
since pj_ 2 includes none of the variables zj_ i, and since p,_ 1 includes none of the 
variables zj. Using Equation (ll), this equation becomes 
Qj-,(Zj-l)uj_loPj_lOUj’=P,(Zj)P/_l”U~/I 
from which it is apparent hat Qj_i(zj_,)uj_, and Pj(zj) are unifiable with a most 
general unifier uj I p,_, 0 a;. In other words, 
uj 0 pi = pj_l 0 Uj’ 
for some substitution pi. This completes the inductive proof of the equations in (10). 
There are now three cases to consider. If the selected branch of !I terminates in a 
ground instance in s,,, or if it terminates because one of the rules P =AQj or 
P =VQj has a null antecedent, then our analysis of the branch is essentially 
complete. In this case, the answer substitution along the selected branch in ‘I’ is 
simply 
(J’ze’oe’o . . . 00,’ 
1 2 I’ 
and by forming the composition of the most general unifiers in (lo), we can see that 
ui 0 62 0 . . * vJj~pj=e(n,k)%J;vJ;~ --* vJj’. 
Let us now set 
(12) 
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where #-’ simply inverts the substitution $ and replaces the constants { ci} in each 
unifier uj with the original variables !y. From an inspection of Equation (12), we can 
easily verify that 
U(Z&++r,k)lU’ 
and 
.(?X)+lfl(n,k). 
Thus u is the desired answer substitution along the selected branch of the inverted 
refutation tree T. 
Next assume that the selected branch of ‘I” terminates when the formula 
Qj(zi)u,! unifies with a ground instance Q(?x; !y)ll, 0 f?(n, k) that was added by the 
second condition in our construction of s(n, k). If the unifying substitution is uj’+,, 
we know that 
Qj(zi)u;++, = Q(?x;!y)$ +z, /+a,+,, 
which can then be rewritten as 
Qj(zj)uj~~j~u;+l=Q(?x;!y)~~~(n,k)~u_+, 
by the same arguments used above. From an induction on the recurrence relations 
in (lo), it is easy to verify the following proposition: Any bindings for the ?x 
variables that are included in pj must be identical to the bindings in t9(n, k). 
Furthermore, if uj includes any bindings for the variables zj that contain variables 
in the form ?x, then pi must also include bindings for these ?x variables. As a result, 
we can rewrite our last equation as 
Q,(zj)uj~pj”e(n,k)~u~+,=Q(?x;!y)11/”pj~e(n,k)~u~+,, 
from which it is apparent hat Qj(zj)u, and Q(?x; !y)# have a most general unifier 
U~+~ such that 
e,+i’ Pj+l=Pjo8(nY k)OUi’,l 
for some substitution P~+~, We can now extend Equation (12) to 
(Iiou20 *.- CUj06. ,+lOPj+l=e(n,k)ou;ou;o .-- ou+__+l, 
and set u=uloul~ e-v ~uj~uj+i~II/ -’ as before. Once again, we can see that u is 
the desired answer substitution along the selected branch of the inverted refutation 
tree ‘I’, and that it has the desired properties. 
Finally, consider a branch of ‘I” that terminates by unification with an atomic 
formula P(zj+i)u, 0 # 0 e(n, k) that was added by the third condition of our 
construction. Since the predicate on the left-hand side of every negation or em- 
bedded implication is unique, the formula under consideration must have been 
derived from a particular rule P = 7Q or P e= [Q - R], and it must have resulted 
from the closure of a particular auxiliary tableau with answer substitution ua. By 
virtue of our construction, uU contains no variables from zO,zl,. _. ,zj, and the 
bindings for the ?x variables included in a, 0 4 must be consistent with e(n, k). 
Thus, by all of our previous arguments, if ai+, is the most general unifier of 
Qj(z,)u; and P(z~+~)u, 0 4 0 e(n, k) in the selected branch of ‘I”, then the follow- 
ing equation must hold: 
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It then follows, as before, that Q,(zi)uj and P(zj+Ju, 0 4 have a most general 
unifier a,,, such that 
for some substitution pj+i. In this case, however, in order to conclude that the 
selected branch will terminate in the inverted tree ‘I, we must also verify that 
Qj(z,)u, and P(zj+i)u, 0 X/ have a unifying composition with respect to the 
variables ?x. But since ai I e(n, k) by the recurrence relations (lo), and since 
a, * a+!~ is consistent with f?(n, k) by construction, it is easy to see that this condition 
is satisfied. 
Let us now summarize these results. For each branch in the original refutation 
tree ‘I’ that terminates with an answer substitution u’, we have constructed a 
corresponding branch in the inverted refutation tree T that terminates with an 
answer substitution u, and we have shown that 
u(zo) 0 J, 0 tY(n, k) 56’ 
and 
It is now easy to see that there exists a unifying composition of these answer 
substitutions across all the branches of ‘I’. For we know that there exists a unifying 
composition of the answer substitutions u’ for the variables z,, across all the 
branches of ‘I’, and the relationships above show that this unifying composition will 
still go through when we “invert” the substitutions 8(n, k) and I/J. We have thus 
shown that there exists a refutation tree ‘I’ for P,(?x; !y; z,), with a grand answer 
substitution u at the top, such that 
and 
U(?X)O $2 @I, k). 
Now assume, at some point in our sequence of rule applications, that we have 
initiated the construction of a new refutation tree in the tableau q by writing the 
atomic formula P,(?x; !y; zO) in its topmost node. Since each component of ‘I can 
be constructed by following the basic tableau extension and closure steps, and since 
the sequence of rule applications is assumed to be fair, it follows that our proof 
procedure will eventually construct the entire refutation tree r in the tableau K 
and place the answer substitution u at its top. This completes the proof of Lemma 
4.8. 0 
At this point, we have constructed a set of substates S(n) = { s(n, k) 1 k < w } for 
each tableau q, and we have shown that these substates atisfy the completeness 
lemma for principal refutation trees. Let us now construct the set 
K=U{S(n)\n<o}. 
We note that K is partially ordered by set inclusion, and that s( 171, j) I s’( m, j, 8,). 
We claim that K has the following additional properties: K 5 Jo and K c T,(K). We 
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will establish these properties in the next two lemmas: 
Lemma 4.9. K c Jo. 
PROOF. We will use the definition of Jo given in the proof of Theorem 3.4. It is 
obvious that K c G. We therefore have to show that every rule P - ye is satisfied 
in every substate s(n, k) E K. We will do the proof here for n > 0, since the proof 
for the substate s(O,O) then follows in a similar manner as a special case. 
Let us select a particular rule P(z,) 3 7Q(z o; zl) for analysis, and let us consider 
any substate s(n, k) E S(n) such that P(z,)B,, E s(n, k) for some ground substitu- 
tion Se. We will analyze the two open nodes of the principal refutation tree 
generated by the rule F - P(z,) A Q(zo;z,) in the tableau 5. By Lemma 4.8, the 
node beginning with P(z,) will eventually close with an answer substitution u0 such 
that 
and 
Now assume that there exists a ground substitution 8, 2 B0 such that Q(z,,; zI)8, E 
s(n, k). By Lemma 4.8 again, the node beginning with Q(zO; zI) will eventually 
close with an answer substitution UI such that 
and 
But it is now easy to verify that a,, and UI have a unifying composition u such that 
a(?~) 0 J/ I 0( n, k). Thus the tableau 3 will eventually close and return the answer 
substitution u to its predecessor, assuming here that n > 0. However, this con- 
tradicts our initial choice of B(n, k) as a ground substitution that is inconsistent 
with u 0 J/, for every answer substitution u returned from 5 as the result of the 
closure of a principal refutation tree beginning with F. We conclude from this 
contradiction that Q(ze; zI)8, 4 s(n, k) for every 8, 2 0,. For the case n = 0, of 
course, we can derive a similar contradiction from our initial assumption that the 
tableau Y0 never closes at all. 
We have thus shown that the substate s(n, k) by itself satisfies all rules in the 
form P * -,Q. For substates ’ 2 s(n, k) we can extend these arguments as follows: 
We note that P(z&, ES’ whenever P(z,)& E s(n, k), and that the principal 
refutation tree that we constructed in K would also be constructed in the tableau 
associated with s’. Thus the arguments above apply equally well to all substates 
s’ 2 s(n, k). This completes the proof of Lemma 4.9. q 
Lemma 4.10. KC T,(K). 
PROOF. We will use Definition 3.5, and show that every substate s E K is preserved 
by the application of TN to K. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the 
substate s is a particular substate s(m, j) E S(m), which was defined in connection 
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with the tableau Ym, and which has a data-base substitution $(m, j) associated with 
it. We can thus analyze the substates ’( m, j, 0,) that were constructed as immediate 
successors to s(m, j), and then renamed s(n, k). 
Consider an arbitrary negation rule P(x) = 7Q(x; y) that is extended at some 
point in the sequence of rule applications from the tableau Ym to a new auxiliary 
tableau 5. We will apply the first half of Definition 3.5 to the substate s(m, j), and 
attempt to show that this definition holds for the selected negation rule. Let fl be 
any ground substitution for the variables in P(x) restricted to the terms in 
U(s(m, j)). From our construction, it is easy to see that the substate s(m, j) 
contains no individual constants in the set { c, } unless ci = J/(!y,) for some existen- 
tial variable ‘!y,’ that was introduced in Y, or one of its predecessors. Thus the 
substitutions 0, that we used in the construction of the substates ’ 2 s(m, j) would 
include all possible values of 8. There are two cases to consider here: If 0( m, j) 0 0, 
is inconsistent with u,, 0 4 for euev answer substitution a, returned from x as the 
result of the closure of a principal refutation tree beginning with F, then we have 
constructed a new substate s’(m, j, 6,) 2 s(m, j) in K, and we have stipulated that 
by the second condition of our construction. On the other hand, if B(m, j)o 0, is 
consistent with a,, 0 J/ for some answer substitution a,, returned from the closure of a 
principal refutation tree in q beginning with F, then B(m, j) is also consistent 
with a,, 0 #, an d we have stipulated that the substate s(m, j) satisfies the rule 
P(x)e,+oe(m, j>= 
by the third condition of our construction, in the prior step of our inductive 
definition. In this case, it follows that P(x)@ E s(m, j). In either case, we can see 
that the first half of Definition 3.5 holds. 
Now consider an arbitrary embedded implication rule P(x) = [ Q(x; y) * R(x; y)] 
that is extended at some point in the sequence of rule applications from the tableau 
,Y, to a new auxiliary tableau K, and apply the second half of Definition 3.5 to the 
substate s(m, j). Let 8 again be any ground substitution for the variables in P(x) 
restricted to the terms in U(s(m, j)), and consider the corresponding substitution 6, 
in our construction of the substates ’ 2 s(m, j). If kJ(m, j)o e,, is consistent with 
a,, * \I, for some answer substitution a,, that resulted from the closure of a principal 
refutation tree in 3 beginning with F, then the analysis proceeds exactly as in the 
case of the negation rules. Otherwise, there will exist a substate s’( m, j, 0,) 2 s( m, j) 
in K such that 
Q(?x;!y)~OB(m,j)oBnEs’(m, j,B,). 
Now assume that the second condition of Definition 3.5 is satisfied. It then follows 
that 
and we can apply Lemma 4.8 to the principal refutation tree in z beginning with 
R(?x; !y). According to Lemma 4.8, this principal refutation tree will eventually 
close with an answer substitution u such that a(?~)0 IJ I O(m, j)o b’,, and when the 
proof procedure strips away the prefix ‘?’ from the variables ?x that were created in 
<, it returns an answer substitution a,, from q such that u,, 0 1c/ is consistent with 
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Qm, j). Thus, by the third condition of our construction, the substate s(m, j) must 
satisfy the rule 
and we can see again that the second half of Definition 3.5 holds. 
Since these arguments apply to any arbitrary rules P * 7Q and P = [Q - R], it 
follows that the substate s(m, j) is preserved by the application of TN to K. This 
completes the proof of Lemma 4.10. q 
Let us now recall the definition of K* in Theorem 3.7: 
K* =U{JIJc T,(J) n Jo}. 
It is clear from Lemma 4.9 and Lemma 4.10 that K c K*. In particular, the substate 
x(0,0) associated with the initial tableau F0 must be a member of K*. Suppose 
P(x)@ E s(O,O). Note that the data base of F0 includes only the ground instances in 
sa, and note that the answer substitutions aa returned to F0 contain no variables in 
the form ?x or !y. Thus, by Lemma 4.8, if P(x)0 E s(O,O), then the principal 
refutation tree in .Y& beginning with P(x) will eventually close with an answer 
substitution u such that a(x) I 8. But this contradicts the initial assumption in the 
proof that our chosen sequence of rule applications never closes. We thus conclude 
that P(x)0 6G s(O,O). This completes the proof of Theorem 4.6. 
We will now state and prove a simple corollary. Theorem 4.6 asserts the existence 
of a closed system of tableaux, but we can use the same techniques to show that 
euely attempt to construct a system of tableaux for a formula that is uniformly 
entailed eventually closes, as long as the sequence of rule applications is fair. 
Corollary 4.11 (Strong completeness). Let s0 be a finite initial substate in B, and let 92 
be a jinite set of rules including negations and embedded implications. Assume that 
(3x)P(x) is uniformly entailed by s0 and 22 with ground substitution 8. Then every 
fair sequence of rule applications starting with the initial tableau for P(x) will 
eventually cfose with an answer substitution u such that u(x) I 8. 
PROOF. Pick any fair sequence of rule applications, and assume that the systems of 
tableaux generated by these rules never close. Then the construction of a substate 
s E K* such that P(x)6 65 s follows exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4.6. 0 
4.5. Fixed Points Revisited 
In this subsection, we will return to the fixed-point semantics of Section 3 (Paper I), 
and show that the conclusion of Theorem 3.15 can be sharpened under certain 
conditions. 
We first establish two corollaries to the soundness and completeness theorems. 
Corollary 4.12 is a generalization of Corollary 2.13 in the pure Horn-clause case, 
and Corollary 4.13 is a sharpened version of the inequality in Theorem 3.15. In both 
of these corollaries, we will assume, as we did in Theorem 4.6, that the initial 
substate s0 and the rules R are finite. However, we will subsequently remove these 
restrictions. 
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Corollary 4.12. If K* is nonempty and A E llK*, then all the individual constants in 
A appear somewhere in the initial substate sO, or in the rules 9. 
PROOF. To prove the corollary, we simply repeat the construction in Theorem 4.6, 
starting with an initial tableau F0 for the query A. In this case, though, we 
construct an infinite sequence of tableaux &, Fi, .Y&. . . , regardless of closure, we 
define the set K = U{ S( n) 1 n < o } exactly as before, and we then analyze the 
substate s(O,O) associated with the tableau .5$. Recall that the data base of F0 
includes only the ground instances in sa, and recall that the answer substitutions a, 
returned to To contain no variables in the form ?x or !y. Thus the Horn clauses that 
are used to construct the substate s(O,O) contain, at most, the individual constants 
from the rules in 9. By Corollary 2.13 to Theorem 2.12, this means that all the 
individual constants in all the ground atomic formulae in s(O,O) appear somewhere 
in se or .G@. 
Now, since K* is n&empty, we know from Lemma 4.4 (soundness) that the 
principal refutation trees in Y0 beginning with F never close. We can thus apply 
Lemma 4.9 and Lemma 4.10, exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4.6, and conclude 
that s(O,O) E K*. So if there is an individual constant in A that does not appear in 
s0 or @, then A P s(O,O), and thus A P llK*, which is a contradiction. 0 
To prove a sharpened version of the inequality in Theorem 3.15, we will use both 
the soundness theorem and the completeness theorem. However, the most general 
form of Lemma 4.4 (soundness) includes an assumption about the individual 
constants in 9, and we must adopt this assumption here in order to get the 
following proof to work. 
Corollary 4.13. Let s0 be a finite substate in B, and let 9 be a finite set of rules 
including negations and embedded implications. Assume that the individual con- 
stants in 5%’ appear in s,,. Then the inequality in Theorem 3.15 becomes an equality: 
nK*= llJ,= U{ llT;(J,)lk<o}. 
PROOF. In Theorem 3.15, under the assumption that K* is nonempty, we showed 
that llK* 2 llJ, 2 U{ llTi!j(J,) 1 k < w }. Thus we need to establish the opposite 
inequality here. 
Assume that A is a ground instance in llK*. By Theorem 4.6 (completeness), 
there exists a closed system of tableaux for A with some answer substitution u. 
Assume that the substitution (I has degree m, and apply Lemma 4.4 (soundness). 
According to this lemma, Au E s for every substate s E T,“(J,) that includes the 
individual constants in A and 9. However, by Corollary 4.12, all the individual 
constants in A appear in s0 or .%‘, and by assumption all the individual constants in 
5% appear in s,,. Thus every substate s E T,“(J,) includes the individual constants in 
A and .%?, and it follows that A E nTc(J,). We have thus shown that 
l-lK* I U{ nT&(J,)lk < U} 
as required. q 
It is an open question whether or not the equality holds without imposing this 
restriction on the individual constants in 9%‘. 
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We will now reconsider the restriction of Corollary 4.13 to a finite sO and a finite 
9. In the completeness theorem itself, this was not a significant restriction, since we 
would never use an infinite set of rules in a practical proof procedure. However, for 
an analysis of the inequality in Theorem 3.15, and for other theoretical purposes, it 
is important to know what happens when sO and 9 become infinite. We know that 
Corollary 4.13 cannot be true for arbitrary sO and 9, since we have seen a 
counterexample in Section 3.4. The question is: What is the weakest condition on sO 
and 92 that still preserves the equality in Corollary 4.13? 
Examining the proof of Theorem 4.6, we see that the finiteness assumption enters 
the analysis at two points: First, we used the finiteness of s,, and ,G%? to show that a 
fair sequence of rule applications exists. Second, in assigning ground terms to the 
existential variables { !JJ,}, we needed a denumerable set of individual constants {cl} 
that did not appear in the query P(x), or in the initial substate sa, or in the rules 9%‘. 
The first use of the finiteness assumption can be eliminated by a standard device. 
Assume, in the worst case, that the execution of every rule in the proof procedure 
creates a denumerably infinite set of applicable new rules. We can write these rules 
down as follows: 
R; R; R; ... 
R; R; R; .a. 
R’3 R; R; +a. 
. . . . 
. . 
assuming that the execution of step S, creates the new rules Rf, R$, R’;, . . . . We can 
then execute these rules in the following order: 
R:, 
R;, R:, 
R:, R:, R:, 
R:, R;+..., Rl;-‘,R:, 
Under this arrangement, any rule that becomes applicable at step Sk will be 
executed after only a finite number of additional steps. Thus every component of 
the proof of Theorem 4.6 that depends on the existence of a fair sequence of rule 
applications remains valid for an infinite sO or an infinite 9. 
The second use of the finiteness assumption cannot be eliminated, but must be 
incorporated as one of the constraints on s,, and 9, The most natural way to do this 
is as follows: 
Theorem 4.14. Let s,, be a (possibly infinite) initial substate in B, and let 92 be a 
(possibly infinite) set of rules including negations and embedded implications. 
Assume that all the individual constants in 9 appear in so, and assume that there 
exists an injinite set of individual constants in U that do not appear in sO. Then, if 
K* is nonempty, 
llK* = I-lJ, = U{ nT;(J,)lk < u}. 
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PROOF. By assumption, there is an infinite set of individual constants in U that do 
not appear in s0 or 9. Thus the proof of Theorem 4.6 (completeness) goes through 
without modification, using the fair sequence of rule applications outlined above. 
Thus the proofs of Corollary 4.12 and Corollary 4.13 go through as well. q 
The constraint in Theorem 4.14 now suggests a slightly different approach to the 
definition of K*. Suppose we are given some arbitrary initial substate s,,, either finite 
or infinite, which includes the individual constants in 9. Choose a denumerable set 
of individual constants that do not appear in s,,, add these to the constants that do 
appear in sa, and then construct the sets U and H and the lattice [B, I] exactly as 
in Section 2 (Paper I). Finally, define K* as the greatest fixed point of the 
transformation T(J) = TN(J) n J,,, exactly as in Theorem 3.7. We are then guaran- 
teed that the equality in Theorem 4.14 holds. 
This construction of K* is reminiscent of the construction of initial models in 
Horn-clause logic [lo, 111. Translated into our present notation, the substate g* is 
an initial model for the rules P eAQj and P =VQ, because there exists a unique 
homomorphism, preserving function and predicate symbols, from g* into any other 
model that satisfies these rules. For clausal intuitionistic logic, where K* is the 
“largest” Kripke model rather than the “smallest” Herbrand model, the analogous 
concept would be that of a unique homomorphism from any Kripke model of the 
rules into the particular model K*. It appears that K* could be characterized as an 
initial Kripke model in this sense, given an appropriate definition of the homomor- 
phism. This topic is beyond the scope of the present article, but it deserves further 
investigation. 
4.6. Variations 
We introduced the simplified proof procedure in Section 4.2 in order to develop a 
more tractable version of the soundness and completeness theorems. But we can 
now show that the simplified proof procedure and the standard proof procedure are 
equivalent, in the following sense: 
Lemma 4.15. Any closed system of tableaux constructed according to the simplified 
proof procedure can be transformed into a closed system of tableaux constructed 
according to the standard proof procedure, and vice versa. 
PROOF. The proof is straightforward, but tedious, and we will only provide a sketch 
of it here. To see how to fill in the details, the reader should compare Figure 1 (the 
standard proof procedure) with Figure 3 (the simplified proof procedure). 
Assume that we have been given a closed system of tableaux with an answer 
substitution IS constructed according to the simplified proof procedure. For simplic- 
ity, we will identify the tableau dependency tree for u and ignore everything else. 
There are two kinds of transformations that have to be made: First, every principal 
refutation tree constructed from a rule Fc= P(x) A Q(x; y) must be split into a 
subordinate refutation tree beginning with P(x) and having an answer substitution 
u at its top node, plus a specialized rule Q(x; y)a =+ F. Second, every closed 
auxiliary tableau that returns an answer formula P(x)u, to a node containing 
Q(x;y)u must be converted into an auxiliary tableau that is specialized by the 
CLAUSAL INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC. II 123 
unification of P(x) and Q(x;y)a. In both cases, since the unifying compositions 
exist in the simplified proof, we are guaranteed that the specializations will go 
through in the standard proof, and that the final answer substitution will be the 
same. 
Conversely, assume that we have been given a closed system of tableaux with an 
answer substitution u constructed according to the standard proof procedure. There 
are two kinds of transformations to be made here, reversing the transformations in 
the previous paragraph. First, every subordinate refutation tree for the formula P(x) 
with answer substitution u must be spliced into the left branch of the appropriate 
tree F = Q(x; y)a, and the branch beginning with Q(x; y)a must then be generalized 
into a branch beginning with Q(x; y). Second, every closed auxiliary tableau for the 
rules P e7Q or P e=[Q * R] attached to a node containing Q(x; y)a must be 
generalized to an auxiliary tableau for the uninstantiated formula P(x). In both 
cases, these generalizations must be “pushed” to the tips of the tableau dependency 
tree, so that a generalized answer substitution is returned. (The procedure is similar 
to the “inversion” procedure in Lemma 4.8.) Since a specialized answer substitution 
was returned to these nodes in the standard proof, by assumption, we are guaran- 
teed that the unifying compositions will go through in the simplified proof, and that 
the final answer substitution will be the same. IJ 
Applying Lemma 4.15, we see that Theorem 4.3 (soundness) and Theorem 4.6 
(completeness), which were formulated for the simplified proof procedure, are valid 
for the standard proof procedure as well. 
Furthermore, once we understand how to transform closed systems of tableaux in 
this way, it is obvious that there are many other possible variations in the proof 
procedures. We list here several examples: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
In Section 3.1, we showed that the expansion rules in the form P * [Q - R] 
could be eliminated from our system, thus simplifying the semantics. But it is 
now easy to see that these rules can be added back to the proof procedure, if 
desired. We simply set up a subordinate refutation tree in Y beginning with 
P(x), and, whenever, the tree closes with an answer substitution u, we add the 
rule Q(x; y)a * R(x; y)u to the rule base of Y. The transformation here is 
thus identical to the transformation from the simplified proof procedure 
using the rule Fe= P(x) A Q(x; y) to the standard proof procedure using the 
rule P(x) * [Q(x; y) * F]. 
We also showed in Section 3.1 that the abstraction rules P c= [Q * R] could 
be simplified by assuming that the variables x and y appearing in R(x; y) also 
appear in Q(x; y). This assumption can also be eliminated in our proof 
procedure, if desired. A principal refutation tree in .9- beginning with R(x; y) 
could thus contain any number of extra variables x and y, and these variables 
would be treated like any other variables in a Horn-clause refutation tree. 
Finally, although we have used And/Or refutation trees throughout the 
present article to simplify the theoretical analysis, the proofs themselves can 
be constructed from SLD refutation trees, whenever desired. To transform a 
proof from an And/Or tree to an SLD tree, we simply specialize the right 
branches; to transform a proof from an SLD tree to an And/Or tree, we 
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generalize the right branches and compute the unifying compositions at the 
‘And’ nodes. An SLD proof procedure does not always generate a fair 
sequence of rule applications, however, and so Theorem 4.6 (completeness) 
must be stated with some care. The situation is exactly the same in the pure 
Horn-clause case [l]. 
With such an array of possible proof procedures available for clausal intuitionis- 
tic logic, all of them sound and complete, we can begin to investigate questions of 
efficiency. Although most of these questions are beyond the scope of the present 
article, we will outline here one important heuristic device. The major source of 
inefficiency in the proof procedures considered so far arises from the negation rules 
P-,Q and P= 7Q. In the standard proof procedure, for example, the sub- 
ordinate refutation trees for the rules P * -,Q can be constructed in any existing 
tableau, and the principal refutation trees beginning with F must then be expanded 
in every auxiliary tableau, since any of these negation rules might lead to closure. 
But consider Example 4.1 again. Suppose we rename the negated predicates in this 
example, as follows: 
P,(x)=not-Q,(x, Y>, 
not-Q,(x, r) = P,(x), 
not-Q,(x, y)+not-not-R(x, y, z), 
not-not-R(x, y, z)*not-Q,(x, y). 
We have now constructed a simple set of Horn clauses, and we can see that ‘PI(a)’ 
is computable from the initial substate s0 = {P,(a)} by a straightforward Hom- 
clause refutation proof. Furthermore, the successful path through the Horn-clause 
refutation tree matches the path in Figure 1 from Y0 to Yr to YZ and back again. 
This device of renaming pre&xzte.s is a familiar trick among PROLOG pro- 
grammers. For example, several of the solutions to the “Alpine Club” puzzle posted 
on the PROLOG Digest mailing list (see also [25, p. 2701, for a statement of this 
puzzle) worked essentially by renaming negations as affirmative ‘not-’ predicates. 
Although the device of renaming predicates happens to give the correct solution 
to Example 4.1, it is not a sound inference procedure. Consider a much simpler set 
of rules: 
f’,(+=~Qb, Y>, 
p,(x) * lQ<x, Y), 
where the device of renaming predicates also gives the correct solution. If we replace 
these rules with a set of rules including function symbols: 
Pi(X) = yQ(x, Y), 
4(x> j ~Q(-T f(y)), 
we can easily see that ‘PI(u)’ is not entailed in our system of clausal intuitionistic 
logic by the initial substate s0 = {P*(u)}. However, in the renamed version of these 
rules, ‘PI(u)’ would be provable. Similarly, if we modify our initial set of rules by 
interposing a Horn clause: 
J’k+=~Qh Y), 
p*(x) z3 ~Q(x, r>v 
Qb, I+= Q,h Y> * Q,k Y), 
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it is also obvious that ‘Pi(a)’ is not entailed by the initial substate sa = {P,(a)}. 
In this latter case, we have to decide how to treat the Horn clause in the re- 
named version. Suppose we wrote this rule (incorrectly) as two Horn clauses: 
not-Q,(x, y) = not-Q(x, y) and not-Q,(x, y) = not-Q(x, y). Then ‘Pi(a)’ would be 
provable, using the first of these rules. From these examples, then, it is clear that the 
device of renaming predicates cannot serve as a substitute for a full tableau proof in 
the system of clausal intuitionistic logic. 
As a heuristic, however, the device has some merit. The existence of a renamed 
solution turns out to be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a proof. In 
other words, whenever there exists a correct proof in clausal intuitionistic logic, we 
can show that there exists a Horn-clause proof in the renamed version of the rules. 
Furthermore, the trace of the renamed proof matches the trace of the correct proof, 
through all the possible principal and subordinate refutation trees, in all the possible 
auxiliary tableaux that can be generated by the original rules. We can thus use this 
trace as a heuristic to control the generation of refutation trees from the negation 
rules P-,Q and P- 7Q. Looking at Figure 1 again, it should be obvious why 
this is so. Instead of searching top down from F in the tableau Yi, which is often 
inefficient, the trace of the renamed proof specifies a bottom up search from the data 
base of Yi. It remains to be seen, though, how successful this search heuristic would 
be in a realistic set of rules. This is a topic for future research. 
5. RELATED WORK 
There are two other similar approaches to intuitionistic logic programming in the 
current literature, by Dale Miller at the University of Pennsylvania [23] and by Dov 
Gabbay and his colleagues at Imperial College [7-91, both developed contempora- 
neously with the present system. In this section, we will survey these two projects, 
and mention briefly several additional projects that are also related. 
The most closely related work is by Dale Miller [23]. Miller investigates a 
logic-programming language that includes embedded implications; he develops a 
fixed-point semantics for his language; and he shows that the resulting system 
implements a subset of intuitionistic logic. For a given program 9 and a goal G, the 
“operational semantics” of Miller’s language, denoted by 9t-, G, resembles a 
simplified version of the tableau proof procedure in the present article. Although 
Miller’s fixed-point operator initially seems to be quite different from the one 
developed here, it eventually computes a least fixed point that is equivalent to the 
substate llK*. The details are interesting: Starting with the set w of all programs, 
Miller defines an interpretation to be any function I: @-+ B subject to a local 
monotone condition. (Here B is the powerset of H, as in the present article.) He 
then constructs a complete lattice of interpretations, with a smallest element I, 
defined by setting II(w) =,0 for all w E ?Y. Next, he defines recursively a weak 
notion of satisfaction: I, w II= G, and he uses this definition to construct an operator 
T on the lattice of all interpretations. It turns out that T is both monotone and 
continuous, by virtue of the restricted syntax of the language, and thus the least 
fixed point of T is given by T”(1,). Finally, for any program 9 and any closed 
goal formula G, Miller shows that pk, G if and only if T”( 1,) 91t= G. In other 
words, the operational semantics is equivalent to the least-fixed-point semantics, 
exactly as in the pure Horn-clause case. 
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In some respects, Miller’s system is more general than the system in the present 
article, and in some respects it is more restricted. For example, Miller’s notion of an 
interpretation is very general, since it takes into account the set of all possible 
programs, not just the set of all possible substates. A program 9 in Miller’s system 
is essentially equivalent o s&L&n our systmand we have been working with the 
set of all substates ’ 2 s,, for some fixed 9, whereas Miller is effectively working 
with the set of all 9 2 %’ as well. When we actually arrive at the computation of a 
fixed point, however, this additional generality may not be that significant. Applying 
Miller’s least fixed point Tm(Z,) to the program 9= s0 u 9, we can show that 
TO”(Z,)(s,U?) = llK*. 
The most significant difference, then, may lie in the two alternative routes to 
essentially the same result. Miller’s fixed-point construction is more abstract and 
homogeneous, treating all the rules alike. The fixed-point construction in the present 
article is more concrete, and more particularized to the specific types of rules. It 
would be interesting to see if there are any substantive differences arising from these 
alternative approaches. 
In addition to these differences in the details of the fixed-point construction, 
there are also differences in the expressive power of the two systems, at least in the 
version that appears in Miller’s published paper [23]. Miller’s system is less 
expressive than the present system, since it does not permit the appearance of a 
universally quantified y variable in the rules P S= 7Q and P e [Q - R]. This 
restriction simplifies the analysis substantially. For example, Miller is able to prove 
the continuity of the fixed-point operator T directly in his paper, but his proof, as 
given, would not go through if there were universally quantified variables on the 
right-hand side of the embedded implication rules. (Recall that the failure of 
continuity in the counterexamples in Section 3.4 resulted from the presence of the 
variable ‘y ’ in the rule ‘P(x) = 7 Q(x, y).‘) Thus, a different approach would be 
necessary in this case. Miller has recently reported (personal communication) that 
he has extended his language to incorporate universally quantified y variables in the 
rules P t 7Q and P S= [Q a R], and that he has constructed a continuous fixed- 
point semantics for this extension. It would be interesting to compare this extended 
system with the system in the present article. 
Although Miller presents everal instructive examples of his operational semantics, 
he does not specify a general proof procedure for his logic. In fact, as he points out, 
the “proof rules” in the operational semantics would require an interpreter to 
“guess” at a closed term, thus causing a potentially infinite branching. The obvious 
solution to this problem is to replace these “proof rules” with some form of 
unification. But how should the free variables be treated? This has been one of the 
main concerns in the work of Dov Gabbay and his colleagues [7-91. In [7], Gabbay 
and Reyle discuss several possible proof procedures for the languages N-PROLOG 
and QN-PROLOG, and for intuitionistic logic programming in general. Their 
strategy is to specify the propositional system first, and then extend it to incorporate 
quantifiers. N-PROLOG is thus defined as a language that includes embedded 
implications, but excludes negation, and is restricted to the propositional case. The 
computation rules for this language are relatively simple. For example, the rule for 
embedded implications is exactly the same as Miller’s rule: 8l~o A * B if and only 
if P u {A } I--~ B. The quantificational anguage QN-PROLOG is then defined by 
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replacing the atomic propositions in N-PROLOG with atomic formulae, which are 
constructed from function symbols and predicate symbols in the usual way. The 
computation rules are also generalized to require unifying substitutions for the free 
variables, and to define the “joint success” of a set of queries {pi t-o Gi} for a 
single substitution 8. 
However, in order to develop a proof procedure for QN-PROLOG, Gabbay and 
Reyle are forced to impose several severe restrictions on the syntax of their 
language. First, the appearance of a universally quantified y variable on the 
right-hand side of a rule P = [Q - R] is specifically disallowed, so that QN-PROLOG 
is restricted initially to the same expressive power as the language considered by 
Miller. Second, the computation rules of QN-PROLOG depend on a distinction 
between two classes of variables: The variables in VARY are universally quantified, 
and the variables in VARY are existentially quantified. But the variables in VARY are 
not allowed to appear in complex terms, so it is impossible to write a great many 
naturally occurring clauses containing universal quantifiers. For example, it appears 
that the set of rules in Example 4.2 in Section 4.1 of the present article would be 
syntactically excluded from QN-PROLOG. Finally, in order to discuss the imple- 
mentation of QN-PROLOG in PROLOG itself, either at the object level or at the 
meta level, Gabbay and Reyle impose a further restriction: VAR, and VARY variables 
may not appear together in the same clause. As we have seen in the present article, 
however, these restrictions are unnecessary. Using the technical device of the local 
tableau variables ?x, our proof procedure solves these quantificational problems 
without imposing any restrictions on the form of the rules. And using the technical 
device of the existential variables !y, our proof procedure is able to handle an 
extended set of rules P = [Q - R] with universal quantifiers embedded on the 
right-hand side. 
In a sequel to this initial article, Gabbay investigates the logical foundations of 
N-PROLOG and QN-PROLOG [8]. As in the present article, the semantics of the 
language is intuitionistic. Gabbay thus proves the completeness of propositional 
N-PROLOG by explicitly constructing an intuitionistic Kripke model, and he 
generalizes this result to QN-PROLOG by analyzing the “propositional freeze” of a 
successful computation. The soundness-and-completeness theorem is stated as fol- 
lows: 9l-, G in QN-PROLOG if and only if 
I-,@‘, E VAR2)[(tlV1 E VAR#+ G], (13) 
where “ t-, ” denotes intuitionistic provability. A critical step in the proof of the 
completeness theorem depends on the existential property of intuitionistic logic, 
namely, that if kr (3x)&‘(x) for some well-formed formula J&‘, then there exists a 
ground substitution 8 into the Herbrand universe such that t-1 &(x)8. Because of 
this property, Gabbay’s proof can proceed from the existentially quantified state- 
ment in (13) to a particular ground substitution 8 that renders (13) true, and from 
there to a propositional trace of the computation rules in QN-PROLOG. Notice that 
Gabbay does not state the completeness theorem for QN-PROLOG in terms of the 
following implication: 
$(tlV, E VAR@=’ (Bv, E VAR&, 
or equivalently, 
(VV, E VAR1)~t+v2 E VAR& 
(14) 
(15) 
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since (14) and (15) are not intuitionistically equivalent to (13) for an arbitrary 
first-order formula 9, even if B contains no free variables in VAR*. In the present 
article, however, where the program B is restricted to rules of the form P -AQ,, 
P*VQ,, P-YQ, P=, Q, and P e [Q - R], and where the goal G is restricted 
to an atomic formula P(x), we have actually established a stronger version of the 
completeness theorem, closer to (15) than to (13). Notice that the concept of 
entailment in Definition 2.2 is equivalent to sO, %‘I=, (3x)P(x), and that the concept 
of uniform entailment in Definition 2.3 is equivalent to sO, .Bt=, P(x)8 for some 
ground substitution 8. Corollary 3.16 to Theorem 3.15 then tells us that (3x)P(x) is 
uniformly entailed by s0 and %? whenever (3x)P(x) is entailed by s,, and .B’. Thus, 
although Theorem 4.6 (completeness) was stated in terms of uniform entailment, or 
sO, &‘I=, P(x)8 for some ground substitution 8, it could also be stated in terms of 
entailment, or se, %‘t= ,(iix)P(x). Obviously, this would not be the case if the rules 
B included arbitrary first-order formulae. For example, since the disjunctive asser- 
tion ‘P(a) V P(b)’ does not generate a unique minimal substate, Corollary 3.16 
would not be true for a program that included this assertion as its only rule. 
Although Gabbay does not include negation rules in the form P - -,Q or 
P = 7Q in his presentation of N-PROLOG and QN-PROLOG, a related article by 
Gabbay and Sergot [9] introduces negation into logic programming in a similar way. 
Their basic idea is to augment a positive program 9 with a set of negative clauses 
JV, and then attempt to prove both positive goals, G, and negative goals, -,G, from 
the pair (9, JV). Notice that the negative clauses in JV can be represented by our 
negation rules P - 7Q, and the negative goals ,G can be represented by our 
negation rules P e7Q, so these two systems are fully equivalent. In fact, Gabbay 
and Sergot establish some of the properties of their system by translating it into 
N-PROLOG and interpreting a negated formula ,G as a rule G * F, exactly as we 
have done in our tableau proof procedures. Given this translation, Theorem 4.3 
(soundness) and Theorem 4.6 (completeness) could be used to establish the sound- 
ness and completeness of Gabbay and Sergot’s system, relative to an intuitionistic 
semantics. Curiously, Gabbay and Sergot do not discuss their system in terms of 
intuitionistic logic, but instead compare it to classical logic. They thus prove that 
both the propositional and the quantificational versions of their system are sound 
with respect to classical logic, which is a weaker conclusion than soundness with 
respect to intuitionistic logic. They also prove, for the propositional case, that if G is 
classically provable from { X ) X E 9 } U { ,Y 1 Y E JV >, then the goal ,,G will 
succeed in their system from the program (9, JV). Gabbay and Sergot do not state 
a completeness theorem in the quantificational case, however, and it appears that a 
proper theorem here would have to be formulated in terms of intuitionistic logic. 
The languages investigated by Miller and Gabbay differ syntactically from the 
language investigated in the present article, but only in a superficial sense. Miller’s 
language and Gabbay’s language both permit embedded implications (and nega- 
tions) to be nested to an arbitrary depth, whereas the system of clausal intuitionistic 
logic does not. However, we can always achieve the effect of indefinite nesting by 
defining new predicates P, - [Q - R] for the nested implications, or P2 - [-,Q] for 
the nested negations. We have thus opted for syntactic simplicity in the rules, 
without sacrificing semantic expressiveness. To some extent, these syntactic differ- 
ences reflect a difference in the initial motivation for the work. The system of clausal 
intuitionistic logic was originally’developed for the purposes of knowledge represen- 
tation and common-sense reasoning, prompted by earlier work on the representa- 
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tion of knowledge in legal domains [21,17], and the rules in these domains tend to 
use a great many explicit definitions, with only minimal nesting. By contrast, 
Miller’s work has been motivated primarily by programming examples, where deep 
nesting is common. Miller thus shows how embedded implications can be used to 
construct modules in logic-programming languages, and he presents several exam- 
ples of the use of his system to develop logically correct implementations of certain 
desirable side effects. Similarly, Gabbay and Reyle present several examples of the 
use of N-PROLOG to name clauses in a data base, and to control the search order 
of a program without the use of extralogical devices. It is interesting to note, 
however, that Gabbay and Reyle also provide an initial practical motivation for 
their system by discussing the formalization of the British Nationality Act, a legal 
example, and Gabbay and Sergot likewise motivate their analysis of negation by 
discussing several egal examples. Perhaps there is a common element in the legal 
examples and the programming examples that somehow stimulates the development 
of intuitionistic log& 
In addition to the articles by Miller and Gabbay on intuitionistic logic program- 
ming, there is an early paper by David S. Warren [30] that investigates the problem 
of data-base updates in PROLOG, and proposes a Kripke semantics for an 
operation that resembles the operation of our embedded implication rules. There are 
also several papers in the current literature that are similar in motivation, although 
not explicitly based on intuitionistic logic. For example, Peter Patel-Schneider has 
been interested in the development of knowledge-representation languages with 
tractable computational properties, and he has proposed a variant of first-order 
four-valued relevance logic for this purpose [26]. Although first-order relevance logic 
is itself undecidable, Patel-Schneider shows that he can obtain a decidable system 
by further restricting the interpretation of the existential quantifier to its “intuition- 
istic reading”. This does not produce an intuitionistic logic, however, but a much 
weaker logic, which lacks the rule of modus ponens. 
The idea of using partial models as the foundation for a theory of logic 
programming has been thoroughly investigated by Melvin Fitting [6]. Although 
Fitting’s system is classical, rather than intuitionistic, by using partial models he is 
able to define three truth values for a logic program: true, false, and unknown, to 
represent a program with infinite loops. Fitting also develops a powerful fixed- 
point semantics for his logic, generalizing the fixed-point semantics of Apt and 
van Emden [l] in a different way than we have generalized it in the present article. 
More abstractly, the notion of a partial model has appeared in several proposals for 
the representation of common sense knowledge. Although the precise details are 
different in each case, the use of partial models is a prominent feature in the work of 
Barwise and Perry [2] and in the work of Hans Kamp [12], to list just two recent 
examples. 
6. CONCLUSION 
We have investigated in this article one possible way to extend the expressive power 
of Horn-clause logic: Add negations and embedded implications to the right-hand 
side of a rule, and interpret these new rules intuitionistically, in a set of partial 
models. We have stated and proven several theorems about this extended system, 
and we have provided several examples of its operation. But there is also a stronger 
thesis here, appearing implicitly throughout the article. We are suggesting, in fact, 
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that an intuitionistic semantics provides the “correct” way to augment our existing 
systems of logic programming, both conceptually and computationally. To this end, 
we have emphasized in this article the similarities between the theory of clausal 
intuitionistic logic and the classical theory of Horn clause logic [29,1], specifically, 
the existence of a fixed-point semantics that resembles that of Horn clauses, and the 
existence of a tableau proof procedure that generalizes Horn-clause refutation 
proofs. But the thesis is controversial, and there is ample room for disagreement. 
Although various other researchers have been exploring similar ideas as discussed 
in Section 5, there are several advantages to the system of clausal intuitionistic logic 
developed here. First, our system includes both negation rules and embedded 
implication rules, and it treats these rules uniformly in both the model theory and 
the proof theory. Second, our system permits the appearance of a universally 
quantified y variable on the right-hand side of a rule P c= 7Q or P G= [Q - R], thus 
enabling us to handle many common examples, such as the expressions (1) and (3) 
in Section 1, where these universally quantified variables are necessary. Third, since 
our tableau proof procedures are based on a general unification mechanism that 
works with two special kinds of variables, ?x and !y, we have been able to avoid the 
introduction of ad hoc devices in the proofs without artificially restricting the syntax 
of the rules. Finally, since the systems of tableaux constructed in the proofs 
correspond directly to the successive applications of TN to J, in the semantics, the 
soundness and completeness theorems for clausal intuitionistic logic are relatively 
simple and clean. This last point is also one of the major features of the classical 
theory of Horn-clause logic programming [l]. 
-In addition to providing a contribution to the theory of logic programming, the 
system of clausal intuitionistic logic is intended to serve as a foundation for further 
work on knowledge representation and common-sense reasoning. Some of this work 
was outlined briefly in [18], a paper discussing the relationship between intuitionistic 
logic and nonmonotonic reasoning [22,16,27]. The basic idea here is to view 
nonmonotonic reasoning as a computation in a single partial model, so that a 
nonmonotonic inference is always an unsound approximation to the correct inference 
in a system of intuitionistic logic. Several familiar forms of nonmonotonic reasoning 
can be explained in this way. For example, “negation as failure” [5] can be 
explained as an approximation to intuitionistic negation, and “domain circumscrip- 
tion” [16] can be explained as an approximation to intuitionistic implication with 
embedded universal quantifiers. Our original examples of an unowned property and 
a sterile container in Section 1 (Paper I) illustrate these relationships. In addition, a 
much broader class of nonmonotonic phenomena can be explained in this way by 
adding a new type of rule to our system. Suppose we reverse the direction of the 
implication in the rules P * AQj and P =VQj, and write down a set of rules in the 
form 
P(x) = Q~G Y) A Q,(x;Y) A . . . A Q,b Y> 06) 
and 
f’(x) =+Q,(x;y) v Q,(x;y) v --- vQ,<x;~>, (17) 
where the variable y on the right-hand side is interpreted existentially. If we now 
add these disjunctiue expansion rules to the rules in the present article, we will 
obtain a system that is (intuitionistically) equivalent o a full first-order (intuitionis- 
tic) logic. For this extended system, we can show that the fixed-point construction in 
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Theorem 3.7 still goes through, but of course the set K* does not have a unique 
minimal substate nK*, and the tableau proof procedure does not work properly. In 
this situation, however, we can designate one of the disjuncts in the rule (17) as 
prototypical, and we can compute with the tableau proof procedure in the protorypi- 
cal partial model, thereby obtaining an unsound approximation to a query that is 
otherwise too complex to compute correctly. These ideas then lead to a rigorous 
analysis of prototypes and deformations, a representational formalism that was 
developed in our earlier work [21] on purely empirical grounds. The details of this 
analysis will be presented in a forthcoming paper [20], which is the complete version 
of [18]. 
The techniques of clausal intuitionistic logic, although restricted in the present 
article to a first-order nonmodal language, are also applicable to a wide variety of 
more complex languages, including various languages for the representation of 
events, and actions, and the common-sense modalities over actions. An example 
of such a language was presented in an earlier paper on “Permissions and Obliga- 
tions” [17]. Three distinct language levels were constructed in that paper: a 
first-order language L, defined on states, an action language L, defined on se- 
quences of states, or worfris, and a deontic language L, defined on sets of worlds. 
Significantly, the meaning of the expressions in each of these languages was 
specified in terms of partial models, called substates and subworlds, exactly as in the 
present article, and the use of partial models in the semantics turned out to be 
essential for the correct representation of a “free choice permission.” However, the 
overall logic of the system was classical, rather than intuitionistic, and this fact 
caused some unnecessary complications. For example, the earlier paper did not 
attempt to develop a proof procedure for the language of permissions and obliga- 
tions, and it suggested that the proofs might be intolerably complex for certain 
kinds of expressions in the action language. It now appears that many of these 
complexities can be avoided by the explicit use of an intuitionistic semantics for the 
languages L, and L,, and by the use of a tableau proof procedure for queries in the 
deontic language L,. These ideas are discussed, without the full technical details, 
but with the use of an extended example, in [19]. The technical details will be 
presented in a future paper. 
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